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several weapons against each, so as to ensure’ that at least one reached its tar- get. A caunterforce strategy thus implies the necessity for a many-fold nuclear superiority over the enemy. Moreover, to have the slightest chance of success such an attack must come as a complete surprise to the enemy: it must be a first strike. This policy has various pseu- donyths: maximum deterrent posture, first-counterforce-strike capability, or, in plain English, preparation for nuclear aggression. Since the possession of nuclear arma- tment raises the possibility that either side could adopt either ane of these strate- gies, both of them must have been dis- cussed in military circles in Moscow and Washington during the years after the explosion of the first hydrogen bombs in 1954. Let us try to find out how the discussions went by studying what shape the nuclear-defense policies of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. took in the subse- quent years. If the Washington figures for Soviet nuclear strength are valid, it is clear that the U.S.S.R. has planned for a purely retaliatory nuclear role and has definitely not planned for a surprise attack on the US. delivery system. As long ago as 1956 the U.S.S.R. was believed to have the capability of making 25 long-range bombers a month. It appears today to have only some 150, compared with the 1,700 U.S. long-range bombers able to reach the U.5.S.R. Even though Soviet medium-range bombers could reach the U.S. on a one-way flight, this is much more than counterbalanced by the 1,500 or so Western fighter bombers, carrier- borne aircraft and medium-range mis- siles able to reach the U.S.S.R. It is also probable that the U.S.S.R. could have made many more than the 50 or to ICBM’s with which it is now credited, since its space program indicates sub- stantial industrial resources for mak- ing missiles. The evidence is that the U.S.S.R. has based its safety on the re- talialory power of a small number of toissiles and aircraft operating from bases whose exact locations are kept as secret as possible. The deterrent value of its missiles is ccrtainly enhanced by the prestige of its space program. That the U.S.S.R. believed the danger of a major war, intentionally injtiated, had been reduced by the advent of hy- drogen bombs seems indicated by the fact that it reduced the total number of men in its armed forces from 5.8 million in 1955 to 3.6 million in 1959. In Janu- ary, 1960, Premier Khrushchev an- nounced the U.S.S.R.'s intention to re- duce this to 2.4 million by the end of 1961. The U.S.S.R. needed fewer troops because it no longer had to rely on a retaliatory land blow in Europe to coun- ter a Western nuclear attack. Its concern about the danger of accidental, irre- sponsible or escalated war is probably one of the reasons for its strong espousal in 1955 of a drastic measure of compre- hensive and general disarmament. [Tomine to the history of U.S. defense policy over this period, it is to be noted that the total service manpower fell slowly from 2.9 million in 1955 to 2.6 million in 1960. The development of improved nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft continued, but not at a great rate, even after the Soviet launching of an artificial satellite in 1957 and much boasting by the U.S.S.R. of its missile prowess. Although subjected to consid- erable public pressure to engage in a crash program to close the alleged mis- sile’ gap, President Eisenhower main- tained that the existing program was adequate for the safety of the nation. In his last State of the Union Message in January, 1961, he declared: “The ‘bomb- er gap’ of several years ago was always a fictien and the ‘missile gap’ shows every sign of being the same.” As 1954 was the year of the hydrogen bomb, so 1961 was for both sides in the cold war the year of the Great Rearma- ment. In the U.S.S.R. the decrease of total armed forces to 2.4 million pro- jected for 1961 was deferred and the arms budget was markedly increased. In July the Soviet Government went on the diplomatic offensive to bring about changes in the status of Berlin and to get the division of Germany recognized. In August it began testing nuclear weapons again, in spite of a promise in January, 1960, by Premier Khrushchev that the U.S.S.R. would not be the first to do so. No doubt there were some political mo- tives behind these drastic moves. Pos- _sibly heavy pressure was put on Khru- shchev from China and from the opposi- tion elements in the U.S.S.R. to admit that his policy of coexistence had not pro- duced political gains commensurate with its possible military risks. But such dras- tic changes, with the inevitable adverse reaction of much of world opinion, would hardly have been made unless there were strong military reasons for them. To get at these reasons it is neces- sary te recall in more detail the cireum- stances in which the changes took place. In the first place the Sights of the U.S. reconnaissance U-2 wircraft must have had decisive importance in shaping the attitudes Me Soviet military leaders. Al- though the over-all nuclear strength of the U.S. is now, and was then, much greater than that of the U.S.S.R., Soviet leaders could reckon that one vital factor would make a U.S. nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R. exceedingly risky: the se- crecy as to the location of the Soviet nu- clear bases. Obviously one of the mairi objectives of the U-2 flights was to locate those nuclear bases. The Soviet com- mand knew that the U-2 flights had been going on for some years before the first aircraft was shot down in the spring of 1960; presumably they reacted by greater dispersal and camouflage. What must have disturbed the Soviet military staff was President Eisenhower's justifi- cation of the fights as essential for U.S. security. This implied that U.S. security could only be maintained if the U.S. had sufficient information as to the location of Soviet nuclear sites to make possible a successful surprise attack on the So- viet retaliatory force. f these were the Soviet fears, the rejec- tion by the U.S.S.R. early in 1961 of the British-American draft of a treaty to ban the testing of nuclear weapons finds explanation in the same jealous military concem to protect the country’s geo- graphica] security, A detailed study of this document makes it clear that the elaborate international inspection system proposed for the prevention of under- ground tests could conceivably have served to reveal the location of at least some of the Soviet missile sites. It would be hard to convince a military staff offi- cer of any nationality that this possibility was negligible. If the West had been content to monitor only the atmosphere against test violations, a much less com- prehensive inspection system would have sufficed and a test-ban treaty might well have been signed. The Soviet fear of inspection may have been the more acute because there was so little in the U.S.5.R. to inspect. The resumption of testing by the ULS.S.R. in September, 1961, would seem to fall into the same pattern of mo- tivation. Although its timing may have been influenced by the Berlin crisis, which Khrushchev himself brought to a head, the testing of war heads with an explosive force of up to 60 megatons and the simultaneous well-publicized success of putting seven ICBM’s on their target in the Pacific at a range of some 7,000 miles was an effective way of re- establishing the U.S.8.R.’s confidence in the few deployed ICBMs that formed its main retaliatory force. Soviet spokesmen