◆ SpookStack

‘were at pains to promote the credibility of the U.S.S.R.’s deterrent by emphasiz- ing to the U.S. the accuracy of its mis- siles and the possible power of the war heads demonstrated in these tests. In the redirection of Soviet military policy considerable weight must also have been carried by the fear that if the NATO rearmament continued, the time could not be far distant when West Ger- many would get de facto control of its own nuclear weapons. In Soviet eves the refusal of the West to take disarmament seriously at the “Committee of Ten” conference in 1960 was evidently deci- sive. As early as November, 1960, the Russians stated that if the West con- tinued to temporize on disarmament, the U.S.S.R. would be forced into massive rearmament. Sometime in the latter half of 1960 or early in 1961 it seems probable that the Soviet military staff began to have doubts as to the adequacy of the mini- mum deterrent posture in relation to the near-maximum deterrent posture of the U.S. Jt must have been Jater than Janu- ary of 1960, for in that month Khru- shchev announced a drastic cutback of both fong-range bombers and conven- tional forces. Since the effectiveness of the Soviet minimum deterrent rested so heavily on geographical secrecy, the U.S.S.R. command may have feared that the U.S., by further air or satellite recon- naissance, or by espionage or defections, would ultimately acquire the intelli- gence necessary to make a successful nuclear attack on Soviet nuclear bases. Probably the main fear of the Soviet Government was that circumstances might arise in which the U.S. Govern- ment would be pushed by irresponsible er fanatical groups into reckless action. The Russians certainly noted the doc- trine of some civilian analysts that it would be quite rational to make a “pre- emptive first strike” even at the cost of 10) million deaths to the attacking side, and the doctrine of others that the U.S. should prepare itse!f mentally and ma- terially to suffer such casualties. I’ the U.S. the program for the Great Rearmament was projected as early as 1059 by the Democratic National Committee. In preparation for the im- pending presidential election the party Jeadership published a detailed study of defense problems and recommended a $7 billion increase (16 per cent) in the $43 billion defense budpet proposed by President Eisenhower. Vhe funds were to po partly for jucreased conventional forces and partly to increase the strength and reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. nuclear striking power. In January, 1961, almost immediately after taking office, the Administration authorized an in- crease of §3 billion and later in the year another $4 billion, thus carrying out the program in full. The present plans include the provision of up to’ 800 ICBM’s of the solid-fuel Minuteman type in underground “hardened” bases by 1965. The Democratic Party’s campaign for increased nuclear armaments was closely linked with the theoretical doctrine of the instability of the balance of terror, derived from the alleged overwhelming advantage accruing to the nuclear ag- gressor. This was ably argued by civilian analysts closely associated with the U.S. Air Force. The U.S.5.R. was said to have both the capability and the intention to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the U.S. In retrospect, it would seem that these “looking-glass strategists” endowed the U.S.S.R. with a capability that it did not have and that the U.S. had once had and had now lost. That the Soviet military staff had reason to take this element in U.S. opin- jon seriously may be judged by the fact that President Kennedy himself found it necessary to launch in the fall of 196] a vigorous campaign against all those in the U.S. who urge “total war and total victory over communism... who seek to find an American solution for all problems"-—against those who were living in the long-past era of the U.S. nuclear monopoly. In this campaign President Kennedy has been vigorously supported by ex-President Eisenhower. Very possibly the U.S.S.R. may have overestimated the potential influence of the proponents of aggressive nuclear strategy and the ultra-right-wing groups that yearn “to get it over with.” None- theless, the fact that both Kennedy and Eisenhower have felt it necessary to combat them must also imply that the Soviet military planners could not afford to ignore their existence. The Kennedy Administration's recent vigorous emphasis on the overwhelming nuclear superiority of the U.S. over the U.S.S.R., and the assertion that the U.S. possesses a second strike that is as strong as the Soviet first strike might perhaps be held in the U.S.S.R. to suggest a & preventive war posture. Undoubtedly the exact reverse is the case. The Ad- ministration’s statements are designed to bury officially the fear of a Soviet first strike, sedulously propagated by those who believe that the U.S.S.R. has pla} for, and in fact now has, a first- counterforce capability, and so at a time of crisis might use it. if this were in truth the situation, the argument that the U.S. must forestall the Soviet blow might seem strong. The Kennedy Ad- ministration evidently foresaw this dan- ger arising and effectively removed it by denying that the U.S.S.R. has ever had an effective first-strike capacity; thus there would be no reason for a forestalling blow in a crisis. The Presi- dent, by emphasizing U.S. nuclear su- periority over the U.S.S.R., has fore- stalled the potential forestallers, or. in the current jargon, has pre-empted the potential pre-empters. At the same time he has refuted many of the arguments on which the Democratic Party based much of its election campaign, and in- deed many of the arguments for his own present rearmament program. It is, for instance, hard to see the mili- tary justification for the program of up to 800 Minuteman ICBM’s in the next few years. If these are, as claimed, rea- sonably invulnerable, this number is at least 10 times larger than is necessary for an effective retaliatory force to attack Soviet cities. The only military cireumstance that could justify such a continuous build-up of nuclear striking force would be that the other party could adequately protect its cities or succeed in perfecting an anti- missile defense system. Recently Sovict generals have boasted that “the complex and important problems of destroying enemy rockets in flight have been solved.” This must refer to the scientific and technical problems; these have also been solved in the U.S. A complete anti- missile defense system that is of any operational significance certainly does not exist today and, in my view, will not exist in the foreseeable future. Suppose, however, that I am wrong and that a System can eventually be constructed capable of destroying, say, 50 per cent of a retaliatory missile attack by 50 1CBM's, so reducing the number reach- ing the target to 25, Even this reduced blow would kill tens of millions of peo- ple. Moreover, it would only be neces- sary to increase the strength of the re- taliatory force from 50 to 100 missiles to cancel out the antimissile missile. This illustrates the general conclusion that can be quite small, any possible defense system, either active or passive, can be canceled out by a small number of addi- tional missiles. The fact that a purely retaliatory posture is little affected by technological innovation, whereas a