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MILES 10 0 10 20 AIR BURST of a nuclear bomb would maximize its effects on a city, the most widespread of which would be due to heat. This drawing outlines the effects of a 10-megaton bomb set off et 26,000 feet. At 12 miles Cinner colored circle) from “ground zero” the fireball, 3.4 miles in diameter, would deliver 30 calories per square centimeter at a rate sufficient to ignite virtually all fammable building materials. At 20 miles (outer colored circle} from ground zero the heat would he 12 calories per square centimeter, enough fo cause third. degree burns and start many fires. Arc extending upward from ground below the burst is a reflected shock weve that would amplily blast effects of the explocion (see drawing below). MILES 10 0 10 2 RADI OF EFFECTS of 2 10-megaton air burst ure superimpoved on a map of St. Louis and the surrounding areu. The two colored circles correspond to the colores 4 clre rles in the drow. ing at the top of the page. The black circles concern effects due to blast. At a distance of five miles tianer black circle) from ground zero virtually all buildings would be destroyed. At eight miles (outer black circle) virtually all wooden buildings would be destroyed. i , # sion that “enough is enough.” In today’s jargon this is the policy of the minimum deterrent—that is, the possession of a nu- clear force adequate only for a retalia- tory attack on enemy cities but incapa- ble of successful attack on the enemy's nuclear delivery system. It is clear that only a small nuclear delivery system is necessary for a minimum deterrent. One big hy drogen bomb dropped on a big city could kill several millions. The small delivery system must, however, be high- ly invulnerable. Otherwise the enemy might think it possible to bring off a successful “counterforce” first strike, airned at the destruction of the eyvetam SS Gt fe OGSSiruoon Ma SIS SRT, Little operational intelligence is needed - for such a minimum deterrent policy because this involves attack on cities, whose locations are known, and does not involve surprise attack on nuclear bases, whose locations therefore do not need to be known. On the political plane, it was thought, the resulting period of relative stability ‘would be favorable fer a serious attempt to negotiate a substantial measure of disarmament, both nuclear and conven- tional. Far-reaching disarmament was seen to be highly desirable, if only be- cause such a balance of terror is stable solely against rational acts of responsible governments. It is not stable against ir- responsible actions of individuals or dis- sident groups or technical accidents. A few suitably placed individuals—a mis- sile crew or the crew of a nuclear bomber on a routine Aight—could kill a few mil- lion enemy city dwellers on their own initiative. The best way to reduce this danger is to reduce drastically the num- ber of nuclear weapons on both sides. The second and quite different doc- trine was that the balance of terror was not even stable against rational acts of responsible governments. This was based on the view that a determined nuclear power might be able to launch # surprise counterforce attack on the enemy's nuclear delivery system of such strenpth that the enemy would not be pee tit ity Weariints Tha able to retaliate. The aggressor, without suffering unacceptable casualties, would then have the enemy at its mercy. The practical consequence of this doctrine is to strive for maximum superiority in number of weapons, maximum invulner- ability of one’s own nuclear delivery sys- tem and maximum intelligence about the enemy's nuclear system. Plainly a successful counterforce at- tack would require knowledge of the Io- cation of all the enemy's nuclear missile and air bases and the power to dispatch