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Then he turned to the change in concept toward the end of September 1960 when he, Col. Jack Hawkins, and Mr. Bissell, decided that ~t would take an air supported amphibious operation of more than ~'OOO men, rather than a guerrilla type operation, to dislodge Castro. After discussing this invasion plan with Mr. Bissell, the expanded operational plan sUbsequently was presented to the Special Group 5412. There was no objection to the plan; and according to Esterline, the basic Trinidad plan was set before the end of December 1960. In response to a question, Esterline said it was his opinion--based on the fact that so many of the brigade's senior officers had been trained I i-that if necessary the brigade could have moved into guerrilla status either in the Zapata area or from Trinidad; moreover, if the guerrilla option was not feasible, the brigade's leaders should have been able to conduct a successful evacuation out of the beachhead by sea. In either case, however, Esterline's premise was based on control of the air. The committee and Esterline also discussed the relative merits of having the command center nearer the scene of the action. Esterline and others who testified before him had argued that having the command post closer to the center of the operation would have given the project leaders a better 150