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committee apparently raised the question of why there were no anti-aircraft weapons taken in with the invading forces, and Esterline pointed out that the expectation was that Castro's Air Force would be destroyed on the ground. Esterline further stated that it was dou~tful that there were any anti- aircraft weapons which could have been taken in by the Brigade which would have been effective against jet aircraft. There was a lengthy discussion between Esterline and various members of the committee about the question of ammunition resupply to the beachhead, particularly the failure of anyone to order the LCls into the beach on the night of D-Day and the early morning of D+l or on the night of D+l and the early morning of 0+2. Esterline himself took full responsibility for this, pointing out that in his opinion the vessels would have been lost to air attack by the remaining Castro aircraft.* To the question of how it happened that the LCls and the other vessels had survived the attacks on D-Day, Esterline's contention was that it was sheer luck. He also was critical of the late approval which had been given for some USAF C-l30s to be used for ammunition resupply, and he suggested that if approval for this air re-supply had been given 6 - 8 hours earlier it might have been feasible to get the aircraft in and out under the cover of darkness. By the time the approval was given, it was too late. * Esterline, like Gray Lynch, was aware that there was a limited amount of ammunition in the 1,OOO-man packs on the LCls. 252 ....