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Years later, Admiral Burke readily acknowledged that the .JCS could be faulted (1) for displaying a certain naivete about the new administration and (2) for failing to voice their reservations about Zapata more force- fUlly. He added, however, that there were important extenuating circumstances. First, they did not realize that President Kennedy conducted business somewhat in the manner of a college seminari decisions could be reviewed and changed up to the moment of execution. Thus the JCS thought matters were settled when, actually, they were still open to discussion and revision. Second, the Administration had in- stalled in aSD a group of civilians who were determined to confine the military's influence upon foreign policy. Consequently, he recalled, the JCS became reluctant to volunteer opinions on any matters that lay beyond their own professional cognizance. General Lemnitzer's afterthoughts were less charitable. The new civilian hierarchy, he concluded, was crippled not only by in- experience but also by arrogance, arising from failure to recognize their own limitations. Thus, without consulting the JCS, they switched tbe landing site from Trinidad to Zapata, canceled the D-Day air strike--and then blamed the Chiefs when matters went badly. 141/* * Appendix C provides a specific example of how Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Richard N. Goodwin continued to poison the weI! against both the JCS and the Agency even after the Taylor Committee had completed its work. 148