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Castro's combat air capability. That it would have to appear to have originated from within Cuba followed automatically in order to support the Zapata plan. In their testimony before the CSG, there i~ no evidence that any of the Joint Chiefs of Staff understood the validity of 0-2 as a tactical operation--or if they did, they decided to ignore it. As with other subjects, Mr. Dulles, who certainly should have known better, failed to correct the testimony of the DOD Chiefs who focused on 0-2 as a purely political, rather than as a military, concept. Of the JCS witnesses who were queried about the possibility that the D-Day air strike might have gotten all of Castro's remaining aircraft, Admiral Burke provided the most accurate description of the situation which would have followed in the wake of such an attack. He pointed out that if some of Castro's combat aircraft remained in flyable condition it was unlikely that a strike against the invading forces could have been launched on D-Day. He emphasized that there would have been great confusion following the heavy strikes which had been planned--casualties would require attention, aircraft would have to be inspected, the runways inspected and repaired, and the dispatch of troops probably would have been delayed. In response to questions concerning the delay authorizing more T-33s from the USAF inventory for the brigade, Admiral Burke reported that T-33s did not have the range to operate out of 146