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notwithstanding the lack of any adjudication concerning their lia- ‘bility in this case, constitutes a totally unwarranted construction of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988. Under the panel's ruling, a Government employee, who is sued for his conduct in the performance of his duties, may have to pay attorneys’ fees even though his conduct was in no way unlawful. The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 amended 42 U.S.C. 1988 to add provisions allowing attorneys" foas to the "pre- , 15/ vailing party" in specified civil rights cases. The 1976 Act was “15/7 42-U.S.C. 1988 reads in pertinent part: - « - In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,. 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], or in any civil action or’ proceedings; - by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the pre- vailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. - 42 U.S.C. 1981-83, 1985, and 1986 by their terms do not apply to the federal Government or federal employees acting under color of federal law. Thus, Section 1988 as the Supreme Court said in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978): : « + + primarily applies to laws passed specifically to restrain state action. See, e. g-, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. [437 U.S. at 694.] Thus, there is no basis for applying 42 U.S.C. 1988 to the federal appellees. « 17 -