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of justice as to federal appellees, and to protect the public interest 12/ in the effective functioning of government. 12/ Judge Swygert concludes that plaintiffs' discovery was unduly hampered (Slip Op. 73). The suggestion that delay prevented presen- . tation of plaintiffs' case appears based om the trial judge's refusal to recall Johnson and Mitchell (see Slip Op. 71, note 43). However, after they possessed all the documents, plaintiffs did not specify what documents they wanted to question the defendants on or what they sought to prove with them, and thus did not properly preserve the point by an appropriate offer of proof (Tr. 28647). See Sperberg v. Goodyear, 519 F.2d 708 (C.A. 6, 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987; Mills v. Levy, 537 F.2d 1331 (C.A. 5, 1976). Discovery in federal courts is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and the trial judge held that federal defendants’ and their attorneys had com- plied with his orders. Reversal will lie only for abuses of discretion which substantially prejudice a party. Lewis v. Texaco, Inc., 527 F.2d 921 (C.A. 2, 1975); Swanner v.) United States, 406 F.2d.716 (C.A. 5, 1969). Any delay in the circumstances of this case, even had the: point been properly preserved,. falls far.below that.-standard. Furthermore, Judge Swygert's opinion ignores the fact that this is a suit against individual employees, and not against the Govern- ment. . The subpoenas were for FBI documents and addressed to Special... Agent in Charge Richard Held (Slip Op. 68). Neither the FBI nor Held, as the trial judge recognized, were parties, and the individual federal appellees do not control production of FBI documents. See Tr. 7259-63-65. Compare 28 C.F.R. 16.21, et seq. The comment that federal appellees did not defend on this point is inconsistent with the fact (see Slip Op. 71) that the trial judge did not hold that there had been any. improper delay and hence there was no need to defend on this ground. Finally, the blame imposed upon counsel for the federal defendants by Judge Swygert and his conclusion that sanctions under F.R.Civ.P. 37 should be imposed are totally unjustified. The trial judge had ruled that federal appellees and their attorneys “carried out the orders of the Court to the best of théir abilities" [Order of April 15, 1977, p. 5S, App. F-150]. Judge Swygert refers to no evidence to the contrary, and certainly none that indicates that the district court *. abused its broad discretion. See Britt v. Corporacion Peruana, 506 F.2d 927 (C.A. 5, 1975). See also National Hockey League v. Metro- politan Hockey Club; 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976). Moreover, even the opinions of Judges Fairchild and Pell, the majority on this issue, appear to be erroneous. because neither judge explicitly found that the district court had abused its broad discretion. Consequently, although the question whether there should be a hearing in the district court concerning sanctions might not independently meet the standards [cont'd] - 15 «