◆ SpookStack

That the Act was not intended to provide for counsel fee awards appellants who had neither established their entitlement to relief through litigation nor obtained relief as a result of filing a law- suit is confirmed by a remark by Senator Tunney, the sponor of S. 2278, that the bill is intended to.provide relief for "those individuals who have been unlawfully deprived of their constitutional rights." ' 122 Cong. Rec. S16491 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1976): Until’a court has found such a violation -- or a defendant, by agreeing to give plain- tiffs some relief has arguably admitted that the allegations of civil rights violations have some basis -- there is no reliable indication that anyone has: been unlawfully deprived of anything and hence no ground on which parties can be said to have prevailed. Directly in point is Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973 (C.A. D.C., 1976), which involved a claim of -interlocutory appellate attorneys: ‘fees under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k), the model for Section 1988. Judge Bazelon explained why Section 1988 does not. permit the award of appel- late attorneys' fees where the matter is merely remanded to the district court: 16 cont'd/ We are in agreement, however, with the dissenting judge of the Court of Appeals when he observed, 472 F.2d at 337, that the award made by the District Court for services from March 10, 1970, to January 29, 1971, did not precisely fit § 718's requirement that the beneficiary of the fee order be "the prevailing party." In January 1971 the petitioners had.not yet "prevailed" and. realistically did not do so until April 5. Con- sequently any fee award was not appropriately to be made until April 5... . [416 U.S. at 723-724.) ; = 19 =