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sande eraneemme meme ee _--* For text, see-Butiermn. of Apr. 4, 1960, P. 611.-- speeches, and in his satellites’ echoes, United Na- tions endorsement of the Soviet plan. But when this resolution is cited by the Communists, it is usually rewritten, and the vital provision “under effective international control” conveniently dis- appears. Even when the Soviets do make refer- ence to controls, they tend to give only lip service’ to @ concept and do not make a serious effort to develop an effective system of verification. The Soviets seam interested only in what label is put on the disarmament package. In the light of our previous experience with them in the use _ Of slogans, we are interested primarily in the con- tents. Until agreement is reached on the contents, how can the label mean anything? What we seek is a secure, free, and peaceful world in which there would be general disarma- ment under effective international safeguards and agreed procedures for the settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. To this end we have submitted concrete pro- posals * on the basis of which the 10-nation group could begin immediately to hammer out specific measures of real disarmament. The Communist side has not been willing to negotiate on specific disarmament measures but has contented itself with urging agreement in principle on abolition of all armies, armaments, and war ministries within 4 years. The Need for Verification - At Geneva the Soviets have thus far sought to avoid any serious negotiation about the question of control and inspection, although they acknow]- edge that this is an essential element in any gen- eral disarmament agreement. In this approach they are reflecting the historic reluctance of Com- munist disarmament negotiators to talk about, much less to agree upon, concrete arrangements to assure that disarmament measures are actually observed. I find it wholly understandable that the Soviet Union, with its phobia for secrecy and with its broad access to information about developments in the free world, should find disarmament con- trol arrangements highly undesirable on the one hand and perhaps even unnecessary on the other. Yet precisely these same factors make it impera- 822 tive for the free world to insist upon an adequate ; system of inspection for verifying compliance with disarmament agreements. In this area, which is clearly vita] to our own security, we can- not rely on promises alone. Control and inspec- tion procedures must be part and parcel of any agreed disarmament measures. The Communist group frequently alleges that proposals for a verification system are designed - for purposes of espionage. They characterize these proposals as a wish on our part to look into everybody's bedroom and into everybody's garden. Now obviously effective international control ma- chinery will certainly result in the gathering and exchange of information. But this should not go beyond what is necessary to establish and sustain confidence. Equal assurance to both sides that commitments under a disarmament agreement are being carried out is essential. This is the essence of international control. In my dictionary, “espionage” is defined as the practice of spying on others or the employment of spies and the systematic secret observation of the words and conduct of others. This is by no means the definition of the operations of an interna- tionally agreed organization whose task is to gather and receive information which will assure both sides that the disarmament agreement is being carried out. In spite of this essentially negative and grudg- ing approach to the central problem of control and inspection, the Soviets must come to realize that we will insist upon adequate control arrange- ments in any disarmament agreement. ; T would like to be quite clear on one point. In this imperfect world we do not expect to see a 100 percent perfect system of controls. Nor are we seeking controls for the sake of controls. Our prime purpose has been, and remains, to work out disarmament agreements that will reduce the pros- pects of war and the burden of armaments. We attach the utmost importance to our efforts to achieve this goal. As a part of such alrange- ments, we seek only that degree of control and verification which will permit the world to know that the agreements are being kept by all parties. We ask the Soviets to accept nothing that we will -not ourselves accept. If the Soviet Union will approach this question in the same reasonable way, I am confident that significant progress can be - Department of State Bulletin se Syren aes epee centy nemmapaegens remmamomammntmme yy tne