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Francis Gary Powers — Part 1
Page 58
58 / 60
- - There are some who have criticized us for agree-—
But we would not be satisfied to stop with these
ing to a disarmament forum based on equal repre-
sentation with the Communist bloc. However,
the reasons for this are clear and, I think,
substantial.
The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the °
UN. Disarmament Subcommittee in 1957 left us
without an agreed forum for disarmament negotia-
tions. We believed that no avenue should be left
unexplored which might offer prospects for
progress on this crucial problem. We were con-
vinced that, although detailed disarmament nego-
tiations would take place for the time being outside
the U.N. by the establishment of the Committees of
Ten,? this would not diminish the United Nations’
responsibility for general disarmament. As a
matter of fact, if agreement can be achieved among
the Ten in Geneva, it will contribute substantially
to a fuller realization of the purposes and prin-
ciples of the charter.
This view was reflected by the General Assembly
in a resolution unanimously adopted at its past
session.’ The resolution expressed the hope that
measures leading toward the goal of general and
complete disarmament under effective interna-
tional control would be worked out in detail and
agreed upon in the shortest possible time.
U.S. Objectives at Geneva
We approach the disarmament problem with two
basic aims:
First, to try urgently to create a more stable
military environment in order to curtail the risk
of war.
Second, to reduce national armed forces and
armaments and to strengthen international peace-
keeping machinery to the point where aggression
will be deterred by international rather than na-
tional force.
To accomplish the first objective, we believe it is
necessary to undertake measures to guard against
surprise attack, to halt future nuclear weapons
production, to reduce existing nuclear weapons
stockpiles, to bring about balanced reductions in ~
conventional arms and armed forces, and to initi-
ate measures to assure the peaceful use of outer
space,
* For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 28, 1959, p. 488,
___* For a statement by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
and text of the resolution, see itd. Nov. 28; 1050,-p- 765. -
May 23, 1960
-Nation Disarmament Conference. = _
achievements. "We want: to-move-on-toward_the__.
. +
Nt nto om Ot
ae
elimination of weapons of mass destruction and
toward the reduction of national armed forces and
armaments to levels required only for internal
security purposes and to carry out obligations un-
der the United Nations Charter. “At the same
time we want to foster universally accepted rules
of law, backed by a world court and an interna-
tional armed force, which would prevent any na-
tion from launching an aggression.
This, in brief, sets the scene for the first round
of negotiations which have taken place over the
past weeks in Geneva. The Soviets thus far have
not been willing to discuss the obvious and specific
initial measures I have outlined. Without
burdening you with the details, I should like to
outline some of the basic differences in approach
to the problem of disarmament taken by the Com-
munist bloc and ourselves,
The Mirage ot Agreement in Principle
So far the Communist representatives at Geneva
have refused to consider any proposals which do
not endorse in principle the Soviet version of gen-
eral and complete disarmament. This Soviet tac-
tic in negotiation is all too familiar. All too often
the Communists seem more interested in slogans
than in serious negotiations.
We have been exposed before to these tactics.
“Ban the bomb,” “Stop all nuclear testing” —these
are familiar slogans which have a certain super-
ficial appeal.
This time the Communists talk about “general
and complete disarmament” as if this were a trade-
mark which they had registered and as if its ac-
ceptance constituted the only way to make
progress in disarmament. During the first 3 days
of negotiations at Geneva, the Communist dele-
gates used the phrase “general and complete dis-
armament” 135 times. They dodge the question
of effective international controls, and thus the
slogan is just as misleading and just as superficial
as the earlier mirages.
Even the Genera] Assembly resolution, which
was cosponsored by all of the members of the
United Nations and which expressed the hope for
“general and complete disarmament under effeo-
tive international control” becomes in Mr. Zorin’s ¢
“Vv. A. Zorin, chairman of Soviet delegation to the Ten-
enn SIS orem Se AMT IE NET OCLC,
FP RICE TE Te ER TE a TY FE I eT Tn aren Sane
' :
Beh EM
i
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