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CIA RDP96 00788r000100330001 5

88 pages · May 08, 2026 · Document date: Jun 26, 1984 · Broad topic: Intelligence Operations · Topic: Cia Rdp96 00788R000100330001 5 · 88 pages OCR'd
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Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5 TEN LESSONS OF LEBANON. American medical students greeted 82nd Airborne sergeant with relief when troop landed at Grenada to topple Soviet-backed regime. Courtesy of Department of Defense Still Photo Collection. willing to sacrifice its soldiers to eradicate the spectre of international terrorism in Lebanon resulted in the dispatch of U.S. Marines, with tragic results. In an open letter to President Reagan (The New York Times, February 27, 1983) more than 130 retired generals and admirals correctly noted that ‘*. . . Israeli ports and bases would be open instantly to U.S. forces in the event of a serious strategic threat to the Middle East. Israel constitutes the only U.S. ally capable of immediate parry to a serious thrust against free world interests in this theater. And, Israel’s continued sharing of vital in- telligence on Soviet operations constitutes the other essential element of U.S. securi- ty in the Middle East.” 5. Terrorist tactics, as employed in Lebanon, permit radical countries to attack the free world in a manner if done overtly, would ordinarily constitute war and justify a military response under international law. As a result the U.S. must be prepared and willing to retaliate by bombing vital targets of nations in- volved in organizing terrorist outrages. According to Washington sources the Ad- ministration is now asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff to find military answers to terrorist attacks. 6. If the Beirut attacks are any indica- tion, terrorists will be employing more lethal weapons in the future inflicting heavy casualties and causing massive destruction. A recent Pentagon study correctly points out that combating terrorism ‘“‘requires an active policy. A reactive policy only forfeits the initiative to the terrorists.’”” No precautions, regardless how elaborate, can assure com- plete safety if terrorists are willing to die for their cause. The best we can hope for is to reduce the potential destructiveness of terrorism. SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- .. Continued 26 JUNE 1984 Ted tf ™ (ALE NATO LE BIER! F Lat ? GERI A victim of terrorist kidnapping, Brigadier General James L. Dozier displays newspaper announcing his release by Italian forces. Courtesy Department of Defense Still Photo Collection. 7, Our experience in Lebanon is a dire warning that the U.S. must adopt new strategies and tactics to fight terrorism, The pre-emptive strike in Grenada and our support of counter-insurgency forces in Cental America, Southeast Asia and Africa are the beginning of a long overdue change in U.S. policy. 8. The aborted Iranian rescue mission and the debacle in Lebanon also raise serious questions about the ability of the United States to conduct successful military missions. U.S. News and World Report (Feb 27, 1984) charges that ‘“‘a confusing command structure sometimes leaves everyone and no one responsible for the success or failure of a military operation.’? Newsweek (Feb 27, 1984) raises disturbing questions about the “absence of decision making’? in Washington. The United States must: e Prepare “U.S. military forces to defend against and counter terrorism.” (Pentagon Study, Dec. 1983) ¢ Streamline the military command structure. e Increase the authority of the chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to reduce and eventually eliminate in- terservice rivalries in combat situations. ¢ Provide for a more integrated in- telligence service. 9. Events since World War Il — in China, Korea, Vietnam and now Lebanon — clearly demonstrate that American 45 military intervention will fail unless two basic conditions prevail: e The clear and unquivocal support of Congress and the American people. ¢ A total commitment by the people of the countries under attack. We cannot and should not commit U.S. military per- sonnel to fight the battles of other people who themselves are unwilling to make sacrifices and carry the major burden of such conflicts. The only exceptions would be in cases where vital U.S. security interests are at stake. 10. A major terrorist objective is to create an atmosphere of chaos, confusion and fear. Regardless how intense and ruthless terrorism becomes, we must not panic. If we do, terrorists will have accomplished one of their major goals. In many ways terrorists are weak and vulnerable. Their defeats far outnumber their victories. Many groups like the Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhof, Turkish terrorists, the PLO and others have been weakened or neutralized. Terrorism cannot destroy a powerful nation like the U.S., but it may cause mass paranoia and give rise to a siege mentality. The success or failure of terrorism will be largely determined by the willingness of the free world to confront and combat it. A policy of appeasement, as events in Lebanon clearly demonstrated, will give impetus to an acceleration of terrorism on world- wide basis. Oo Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5
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