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CIA RDP96 00788r000100330001 5

88 pages · May 08, 2026 · Document date: Jun 26, 1984 · Broad topic: Intelligence Operations · Topic: Cia Rdp96 00788R000100330001 5 · 88 pages OCR'd
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Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5 SPECIAL EDITION -- By O. H. Rechtschaffen n assessing U.S. involvement in es the true significance is being obscured by the political turmoil sur- rounding the withdrawal of our Marines from Beirut. Stripped of political demagogy, Lebanon is a classic example of what a re- cent Pentagon study called warfare ‘‘on the cheap.’’ There are at least 10 lessons to be learned from the Lebanese ex- perience: 1, The slaughter of our Marines in Beirut is directly attributable to our underestimation of international terrorism. Terrorism is not an abberation but ‘‘a new kind of warfare.’’ Most ter- rorist attacks are planned, financed and coordinated by communist and Islamic governments as an instrument of national policy. The new strain of terrorism is no | carefully or- longer random, but chestrated. The Kamikaze-type assaults demonstrated that the attackers worked from detailed operational and intelligence plans. 2. For the Soviet Union terrorism is a low-risk operation that holds greater promise of accomplishing their goal of | world domination than direct confronta- tion. Syria has become a Soviet surrogate and has apparently chosen the same path as Cuba did 15 years ago. The Soviet Union and radical Arab states have no in- terest in a unified Lebanon unless that country is under their complete domina- tion. The ultimate outcome of this policy is fragmentation and division. The slaughter in Lebanon will not only con- tinue but accelerate. The Christian population is in mortal danger and is already furning to Israel for protection. 3. Moderate Arab states do not dare to geome to an accommodation with Israel. Professor O. Rechtschaffen is professor and Chairman of the Public Justice Depart- ment at St. Mary’s Univer- sity in San Antonio, He was Associate Professor of Political Science at the Air Force Academy when he retired after 23 years in the Air Force. This is his second article for this report. He wrote on terrorism in the last issue. TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984 R.O.A. NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT May 1984 Pages 11,12 The Ten Lessons of Lebanon Terrorist bomb destroyed most of U. S. embassy in Beirut. Official U. S. Marine Carps photo. President Sadat of Eygpt was gunned down. Jordan’s King Hussein has been repeatedly threatened with assassination and war. Even Arafat has become a target because Islamic radicals consider him “too moderate.’’ Terrorists have failed to destroy Israel but have succeeded in im- posing a reign of terror over the entire Arab world. Dr. Helms of the Brookings Institute correctly points out that ‘‘the greatest fear of the moderate Arab leaders is not that Iran will attack the oil fields with airplanes but that the Ayatollah Khomeini will undermine their political legitimacy.’’ Radical countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya are intent at spreading | | their particular strain of Islamic extremism with fire and sword over the entire region. The perception that these countries could be persuaded to pursue policies of moderation is wishful thinking and dangerously illusionary. 4. Terrorism can be defeated as the Israeli pre-emptive strike of 1982 clearly demonstrated. As a result, the world’s most violent terrorist group, the PLO, is in disarray. Unfortunately, misguided Western nations in coordination with leftist-oriented and communist govern- ments coerced Israel into abandoning its imminent victory over Soviet-supported and Syrian-directed terrorism in Lebanon. The lack of support for a country that was CONTINUED NEXT PAGE 44 Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5
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