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The Colonel was far more positive about the disastrous results of cancellation of the pre-D-Day and D-Day air strikes as he closed the third meeting of the Taylor Committee by reading his memorandum on "Factors which Hampered Preparations for and Conduct of Effective Paramilitary Operations, Cuba." The memorandum emphasized that: The paramilitary staff, on the other hand, consistently informed all authorities concerned that the operation could not be conducted unless the opposing air force was knocked out before the landing, and unless the landing force was continually supported by effective tactical air oper~t~ons as long as it was in a combat situation. __ Hawkins·s memorandum also made two additional positive assertions which--unfortunately from the CIA point of view--were largely disregarded in the subsequent meetings and in the findings of the Taylor Committee. Hawkins was the only witness to suggest th.at: If this decision [to cancel the D-Day strikesJ had been communicated to the paramilitary staff a few hours earlier, the operation would have been halted and theshi~s withdrawn with troops on board. 3 /'" In similarly blunt fashion the Chief, WH/4/PM wrote that: "The curtailment of tactical air must be regarded as the one factor 33/** Which 'insured failure of the operation." * Emphasis in original ** Writer's emphasis. '. 47