◆ SpookStack

They [presumably the Headquarters planners and air operations personnel in the field] were surprised, however, by the capa- bilities of the pilots which Castro committed against the invasion force. , In retrospect it was believed that these aircraft were probably flown by 50 Cuban pilots that had been trained in Czechoslovakia and returned to Cuba a few days before the invasion. 35/* Castro had only 13 pilots available for combat, none of whom had been trained in Czechoslovakia~ and three of the FAR pilots who played principal roles in the attacks against the invading forces were purely and simply lucky beyond belief. For example, Alvaro ~rendes Quintana had been detailed to the infantry for the three months prior to the invasion, and he had done no recent flying until he took off in a T-33 on the Morning of the invasion and show downtra B-26. Gustavo Bourzac had never fired the machine guns on an aircraft until he helped sink the Houston. Douglas Rudd Mole'had done no flying for five months prior to bei~g recalled to the air service after the 36/ air stri.ke on 15 April 1961, and he helped destroy a B-26.- A more important tactical consideration concerning the employ- ment of FAR by Castro was his order that the first target which should be taken under attack was the shipping that was bringing the forces into Cuba--this was exac~ly what had been predicted in the 22 January 1961 briefing for Secretary Rusk and repeated during the Bissell and Cabell meeting with Rusk on the night . 37/ of 16 April. * As with Mr. Dulles, there is no record that J.C. King was present at this meeting, but the writer suspects that this comment probably was made by King. Certainly he was most insistent that there were MIG aircraft in Cuba and that East European personnel were engaged in the fighting. 49