◆ SpookStack

The question has been raised in some quarters as to whether the amphibious/ airborne operation could not be mounted without tactical air preparation or sup- port or with minimum air support. It is axiomatic in. amphibious operations that control of air and sea in the objective area is absolutely required. The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of 'opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious 'ship~ing makes its final run into the beac. If this is not done, we will be courting disaster. Also, since ottr inva- sion force is very small in comparison with forces which may be thrown against it, we mustc'ompens'ate for numerical in- , 'fe'riority' byeffective tactical air sup- port not only during the landinj but there- 'after as long as the force rernaJ.ns in com- bat. It is essential that opposing mili- tary targets such as artillery parks, tank parks, supply dumps, military convoys, and troops in the field be brought under effec- tive and continuing attack. Psychological considerations also make such attacks essentiaL ' The spectacular aspects of air operations will So far toward P2~9ucing uprising in Cuba that we seek. __ w When asked if the Agency had taken "a strong position" with secretary of State Rusk during the meeting at which the D-Day strike was called off by President Kennedy during the telephone conversation with Mr. Rusk, Hawkins's opinion was reported to have been: Probably not strong enough. It was indicated that the worst would be that the invaders would not have their B-26 support and if the ships were on their way out, the force would be denied its resupply capability. 30/** * ','Writer:' Sl :empha$is.. ** As will be noted, the responses by General Cabell and Mr. Bissell during the meeting with Secretary of State Rusk were major points of discussion at subsequent meetings of the Cuban Study Group. 46