◆ SpookStack

Neither of these requests for air support fro~ the Navy was acted on i~ediately;:andwhen authorization for assistance from the carrier task force was granted, it was ~inimal. In t~e early hours of 19 Apri~ (Schlesinger says shortly after 1:00 a.m.), the President, during a meeting with his high level advisers, authorized' one hour 6f air cover for the Brigade B-26s by six unmarked jets from the' Essex.* Among the other caveats, the Navy jets were not to seek air combat nor attack ground targets. 3/ Once this decision was made, Headquarters sent a message to Puerto Cabezas stating among other things that there would be: "positive aggressive Navy air support and cover" from l130Z to l230Z, on 19 April and that all "enemy forces on approaches leading into Playa Giron airfield should be attacked." , But even as this authorization for one hour of a CAP was being flashed to Nicaragua; the air base was sending a message through Headquarters at 08l5Z (0215 Nicaragua/03l5 Washington) to the commanding officer of the Essex specifying that the USN air CAP be, provided at the area of "Blue Beach not at the 12 mile limit." * In addition to himself and the President, Schlesinger wrote that other attendees at the meeting were the Vice-President, McGeorge Bundy, Secretaries Rusk and McHamara, Walt Rostow, General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, and r~r. Bissell. One might wonder whether the presence of DCI Allen Dulles would have led to a more realistic use of the USN CAP than emerged from this meeting. Dulles's absence fro~ the US from around noon on D-2 until'nearly midnight on D-Day--he was in Peruto Rico keeping a scheduled date to address the Young Presidents organization-- was one of the worse--of not the worst--decisions he made as DCI.