◆ SpookStack

Shortly after 0900 Cuban time,Puerto Cabezas sent an EMERGENCY message to the Task Group reporting the shoot down of a B-26 with an American crew into the ocean and requesting that a rescue attempt be made. This message was soon followed by a series ot messages from Puerto Cabezas reporting that two a-26s with American crews had been lost and that the promised USN air CAP had never materialized. The cables from Nicaragua culminated with Teegen's message to Headquarters shortly before noon $aying: Today·s ~erican crews dispatched as last resort, confident ot Navy cover, per Headquarter's guidance. lUll not send any more B-26.s from this base under present conditions. Before 3:0.0 p.m., Washington time, on 19. April, a message went from Headquarters to puerto Cabezas telling them to stand down all air activity pending further advice.* In theme$sages from the field to Headquarters between 17-19.. April, there were repeated complaints about the failure of Navy aircraft--even within the limits specified prior to 19 A~ril--to fly low eno~gh so that their mere presence might serve to protect the B-26s from attack. The crucial failure, however, * There had been a meeting in DCI Dulles's office about 8:30 a.m. on 19 April attended by McGeorge Bundy and the key personnel 1nvolved in the project--DDCI Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Jake Esterline, Dick Drain, Colonels Hawkins, Beerli, and Germosen, and Captain Scapa. Bundy called President to request that Navy air be authorized to attack both ground and air targets. The President refused to authorize ~ny extension beyond the hour granted for the morning. 280