◆ SpookStack

Explanations for the failure of the rendezvous have focused on the time frame-~the Navy claiming that the CIA B-26s arrived too early and the Agency claiming that the CAP arrived too late. Degeneration of this dispute to firm assertions and positive denials ignored the available evidence which makes clear that the failure o~ the CAP was the result of an inexplicably sloppy performance on the part of the Navy even if the B-26s arrived as early as the Navy has claimed. The Navy deliberately de- stroyed records which reflected on their poor performance. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how this conclusion was reached on the basis of evidence that was available before the Maxwell Taylor Committee completed its investigations of the BOP operation in mid-June 1960. Review of the messages, memorandums, and other pertinent information shows that USN planning for operation BUMPY ROAD (the Navy's identification of CIA's anti-Castro program} began on 25 ~1arch 19.61 with authorization from the JCS. On 1 April, Rules of Engagement were issued for surface shipping and air patrols: and on 11 April, the USN Task Group got its first orders to pro- vide Early Warning ~Nt of Castro aircraft for the Brigade ships. 1/ Also on 17 April 1961 a JI'lernorandurn from the USN officer _serving as the Agency's liaison officer with the JCS set forth the Rules of Engagement for the carrier task group which set limits on the distance from Cuban territory for both carrier ann aircraft 276 ..,