◆ SpookStack

Statement: Yes, I understand, but we're just talking about the beginning. The important thing is that you didn't turn one plan down because of the air strike situation, and yet you did turn another plan down because the air strike situation wasn't adequate. You didn't turn Zapata down because the air strikes weren't considered adequate, and yet the air strikes consisted of taking off after dawn. General Lemnitzer: I didn't think there was any material change in the air plan. The targets were the same regardless of where you'd land. On D-Day the air plan involved going after the Cuban Air Force; thereafter they would take under attack any movement of troops to the area and they would attempt to knock out micro- wave communication stations on which the Cuban national communications were largely dependent. Question: What did you think would happen if you weren't 100 percent successful and didn't get a couple of T-33s? General Lemnitzer: In war, you never expect 100 percent success. However, a couple of T-33s are not going to be decisive elements in an operation of this kind. Question: Were there any comments or discussion about the T-33s in particular? General Lemnitzer: I think I had in- formation that they were armed, because we had been trying to get some kind of equipment against the Pathet Lao, and we were considering what the distribution of T-33s was around the world. We saw that some of them had been armed as reconnaissance planes, and it was suspected that the Cuban air force had armed theirs--but they weren't bombers.