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closed his eyes, and held his breath. He then looked at the rear of the van, told Whitehead he had a cooler he had meant to put some ice in, and reached toward the rear latch. Whitehead said not to open the door and asked Maynard if he would consent to a search; when Maynard said "yes," Whitehead frisked Maynard for weapons, asked Gordon to step out of the vehicle, frisked him for weapons, and then gave the carine unit the go- ahead. The dog alerted while sniffing around the car, and the ensuing search of the van turned up $69,000 in cash. Before trial the appellants moved unsuccessfully to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, arguing, as they do now, that by extending the traffic stop after giving Maynard his written warning the police (1) unreasonably seized Maynard, see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 (2005) ("A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time. reasonably required to complete that mission'), and (2) unreasonably searched the van, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The district court held the extended stop was not a seizure because Maynard was free to leave and, if it was a seizure, then it was lawful because it was supported by reasonable suspicion. As for the search of the van, the district court held the canine sniff was not a search and, once the canine alerted, the police had probable cause to search the vehicle. "We consider a district court's legal rulings on a suppression motion de novo and review its factual findings for clear error giving due weight to inferences drawn from those facts and its determination of witness credibility." United States y. Holmes, 505 F.3d 1288. 1292 (D.C.Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks deleted) In determining whether a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth. Amendment, "the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). This inquiry *tak [es] into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, id., in the light of which we.ask "not whether the citizen [in this case] perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that Jmessagelto a reasonable person," California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991). So it is that "[a]stop or seizure takes place only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some (D.C.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment's Seizure Standard. 99 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 51, 60 (2009) ("The Court has declined to find seizures based on mere interaction with law enforcement without a showing of some degree of outward coercion"). Whether a seizure has taken place "is a legal conclusion that this court. reviews de novo." United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1086 (D.C.Cir.1992) *5 The appellants argue Maynard was seized because, when Officer Whitehead told Maynard he was free to go, he "had already decided that he was going to search the van.... Whitehead had no intention of letting him go until after he [had searched it]." This assertion, even if true, has no bearing upon whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline Whitehead's request. That Maynard seemed nervous when Whitehead 6TT 00087