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soe Qesao ~ ie tb Ww RENNER v. LICHTENWALNER 271 Cite as $13 F.Supp. 271 (1881) We must therefore consider the effect, if any, of the jurisdictional statute under which Senator McClure seeks to sue. It is difficult to see how this statute may, con- sistent with article III, confer upon a sena- tor or member of the House of Representa- tives a “right” to seek a decision from a federal court that such a senator or member of the House would otherwise be powerless to procure. The statute is not premised on protecting the effectiveness of a legislator’s vote under the rationale of Coleman v. Mil- ler, for it purports to grant standing to senators who voted for Judge Mikva as well as to those who voted against him. Fur- thermore, the statute purports to grant standing to members of the House of Rep- resentatives, who had no vote on the ap- pointment at all. And we see no relevance, at least insofar as standing for members of the House is concerned, in the fact that Judge Mikva was, before his appointment to the bench, himself a member of the House. ~ Thus, we hold that Senator McClure, even with aid of the special jurisdictional statute on which he seeks to rely, does not have standing to bring this suit. The jurispru- dential considerations go beyond simply set- ting proper limits on judicial power and containing its exercise within its rightful sphere. They serve also to protect against other branches of government, no matter how well-intentioned, voluntarily ceding to the federal judiciary powers and responsi- bilities that_rightfully belong to the legisla- ture or the executive. At bottom, the vice of the statute before us is its muddling of the roles, its blurring of the lines between the branches of government. Members of Congress are the democrati- cally-elected representatives of the people, chosen by them to enact the laws of the United States, to advise and consent to the appointment of policy-makers in the execu- tive branch and judges in the judicial branch, and to perform certain other func- tions prescribed by the Constitution. The 9 Since we have determined that plaintiff McClure does not have standing to bring this suit, we do not reach the question of personal statute under which Senator McClure brings this suit casts members of Congress in the role of special attorneys general, to plead before this court for a second opinion as to whether their judgments were right in voting for or against the confirmation of Judge Mikva. Under the Constitution, it was the duty of Congress itself, in the first instance, to determine Judge Mikva’s quali- fications both on the merits and on the issue of whether he was constitutionally eligible to serve as a judge. To allow mem- bers of Congress to.change hats, as it were, to plead the unconstitutionality of their own acts before this court on the basis of an argument already debated in the Senate but lost there by vote, would, we suggest, set a dangerous precedent. We find that this court does not have jurisdiction, and we accordingly dismiss.® . W ° £ KEYNUMBERSYSTEM t Jennifer RENNER, a minor, by her parent and natural guardian, Patricia Renner and Patricia Renner in her own right v. Martin and Mary LICHTENWALNER. Civ. A. No. 78-3219. | United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. May 6, 1981. In a personal injury and diversity ac- tion, the District Court, Troutman, J., held that Pennsylvania’s rule that in action for monetary relief for bodily injury court shall add, to amount of compensatory damages and verdict, damages for delay at ten per- cent is applicable to diversity actions in federal court. Judgment amended. jurisdiction over Judge Mikva nor any of the other issues raised by the parties. 27 | 7 iu = es