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\ 270 513 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT © danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest com- mon to all members of the public.” 302 U.S. at 634, 58 S.Ct. at 1. As a private individual, then, it seems that Senator McClure does not have sufficient personal interest in the validity of Judge Mikva’s appointment to have standing in federal court. [3] Senator McClure contends, however, that his special duties and responsibilities as senator gave him standing to challenge the appointment. The precise nature of a legis- lator’s standing to sue in federal court is a matter of no small importance, for a readier access to courts by legislators, as legislators, is likely to give the courts increased oppor- tunity and obligation to decide matters of public importance that might previously have been left to the legislative and execu- tive branches. It is nevertheless the case that, in at least some circumstances, a legis- lator does have standing to sue as a legisla- tor when he or she would not have standing as an individual. The touchstone is wheth- er the legislator’s interest in “maintaining the effectiveness of [his] votes” is sufficient to confer standing to challenge an action impairing that effectiveness. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 483, 438, 59 S.Ct. 972, 975, 83 L.Ed. 1885 (1989). In Coleman, the Su- preme Court held that a group of Kansas legislators had standing to challenge both the right of the state’s lieutenant governor to break a tie vote in the state senate, and the efficacy of the state’s attempted ratifi- cation of an amendment to the United States Constitution which the state legisla- ture had previously rejected. This principle has re-emerged in a recent case in the Dis- trict of Columbia Circuit, in which Senator Kennedy was held to have standing to chal- lenge President Nixon's pocket veto of a health care bill during a congressional re- 7. See also Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C.Cir.1973) (member of House of Represent- atives lacks standing to seek declaratory judg- ment prohibiting certain illegal activities by Central Intelligence Agency); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975) (members of House of Representatives lack standing to challenge expenditure of funds for cess, Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.Cir.1974). Senator Kennedy argued that the bill could not validly have been pocket vetoed during a recess, and that President Nixon’s action not only deprived the Senator's earlier vote in favor of the bill of its effectiveness, but also deprived him of the opportunity to vote to override a normal veto.” It is difficult to see how Senator McClure _. can argue that the effectiveness of his vote is impaired by the appointment of former- Congressman Mikva to the federal bench. Senator McClure had the opportunity to persuade his colleagues to vote against the confirmation and, in the conscientious per- formance of his duties, Senator McClure did just that.2 That he and like-minded sena- tors did not prevail in the Senate does not mean that the effectiveness of Senator McClure’s vote was impaired within the meaning of Coleman v. Miller. It means merely that. he was on the losing side. Cer- tainly no one would contend, and we do not understand Senator McClure to contend, that the losing senators in any vote should automatically have the right to appeal to a federal court for a determination of the correctness of the result approved by the majority of their colleagues. If this were the case, federal courts would on such occa- sions be little more than legal advisors to the Congress, whose counsel could be obtained at the instance of any single mem- ber of that body. This would, of course, amount to the giving of advisory opinions that, whatever their desirability in a partic- ular case, we are forbidden to provide. Thus, at least without a statute authorizing such suits, Senator McClure lacks standing to challenge, either as an individual or as a Senator, the appointment of former Con- gressman Mikva to the Court of Appeals. military action in Southeast Asia); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2nd Cir. 1973) (member of House of Representatives lacks standing to seek declaratory judgment prohibiting military action in Cambodia). 8. See note 4, supra. We must tr any, of the which Senato difficult to x sistent with ¢ tor or membe tives a “righ federal court of the House to procure. ' protecting th vote under tl ler, for it p senators who as to those ' thermore, th standing to 1 resentatives, pointment at at least insof the House i: Judge Mikva to the bene House. ~ Thus, we h with aid of t: on which he standing to dential consi ting proper containing it sphere. The other branct how well-int the federal ; bilities that : ture or the « of the statu: the roles, its the branches Members | cally-elected chosen by t United Stat: appointment tive branch branch, and tions preser. 9. Since we McClure dc suit, we do