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F ty ia Siete Siva oo Nason enh oe Mr. Apama. It depends on where you are in relation to what is taking place. If there are a lot of activities in connection with street. demon- strations that are not violent, and there are a lot of street demonstra- tions that have resulted in deaths, so it just depends on the activity taking place and the circumstances. Our problem is we are given the responsibility by the Attorney General to momitor demonstrations which have the potential of violence. The question is, how do you find out, at what point do you get in any monitor demonstrations to deter- mine if that has a potentia] violence? . Senator Harr of Colorado. Well, obviously we have received testi- mony to the effect that the FBI went out of its way to foment violence itgelf, to encourage disruptions internally, to encourage hostilities and conflict between and among these groups in the hope that violence would oceur, Therefore you could go back to the Director or the press or whomever and say, look, this is a violent group. Mr. Apama. I accept the allegation but I don’t accept the fact. The conclusion, from what I have scen in reviewing these files in connec- tion with our investigations, is that we don’t foment violence. We don’t permit as a matter of policy our informants to act as provocateurs to engage in violence. [ am not denying it may have happened, but the FBI does not foment violence, and the FBI, you know, has no—— Senator Hart of Colorado. You are using present tense verbs. Mr. Apams. We didn’t then. I don’t agree that our actions in any event were designed to foment violence. _ Senator Harr of Colorado. I think there is plenty of documenta- tion of the attempt to set the Black Panthers against the Blackstone Rangers in Chicago. Mr. Anas. Well, I don’t consider that plenty of evidence. I think the evidence to the contrary is that one of the organizations, when we got word that the Black Panthers versus United Slaves, we notified the local police that this activity was going to take place. and the individua 7, 80 that we would prevent the killing, which had come to our attention and was going to take place, and then the turndowns of various COINTELPRO actions, there were specific statements made, that this action will not be approved because it might result in harm to an individual, physical harm. and we have no indication from any of these actions under COINTELPRO that any violent act occurred, and I have not been presented with any by the staff from their far more extensive inquiry. Senator Harr of Colorado. June 3. 1968, a memorandum from the special agent in charge of Cincinnati to the Director of the FBI. captioned Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of the New Left, a five-page memorandum having to do with Antioch College in Ohio [exhibit 30°]. It is a long description of the college and background. There is a recommendation on page 3: “Cincinatti recommends that counterintelligence action be taken to expose the pseydointellectual image of Antioch.” and it gives specific ways of doing that, then the next page. page 4, the desired result of action. “force Antioch to defend itself as an educational institution.” Where in the Jaws of this country or the charter of the Federal Bureau of 1 See pp. 434 through 4868,