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1 Me ee CAITID STATE BEFUATOILNT OF JE SEILE FRUKRAL BURKAY OF IR CERT IGNTION WabsiNGTeN, GC. sees September 23, 1975 STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTER ; yO BTOY GOVERNHENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (58C) t RE: SUAREPTITIOUS ENTRIES - DOMESTIC TARGETS ference is made to £6C letter dated september 22, 1975 fron Re. John fT. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Fask Force, to Me. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel ~ —— am be Peet hee 8 for Intelligence Coordination, Gffice of ths Seputy Attorney ith 1, wherein Mr, Elliff made the following request w seapect’ ta domestic targets of surreptitious entries con- ducted by the PAT: 1. Statistics on the yolume of such surreptition tries in inclusive categories such sa “subversive, “ : white hate," organised crime," or "miscellaneous." These statistics should be cleared for public disclosure. 2. Compittes access at FBI Headquarters to a complete liat of specific targets, represented by the etatietios in Item 1, above. 3. Delivery to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the list of specjfic targets requested for access in Item 2, above. With respect to this t, from 1942 to April, 1966, surreptitious entry was aril ised by the PAI on a highly selective basis in the conduct of certain investigations. Available records and recollection of Special Agente at FBI Meadquartera (FBIAQ), who have knowledge of such activities, identify tha targets of surkeptitious sntriss as domastic subvers ve and white hate groupe. Surreptitious entry was used to obtain secret and closely guarded organizational and financial information, and membership liata and monthly seports of target organisations. Patri 7 Oe wa When a Special % in Charge (SAC) of a field attive considered surreptitious entry neceasary to the jatact of an investigation, he would make his request to te appropriate Assistant Director at FEING, justifying te nuod for an entry and aseuring it could be accom- piishod safoly with fall security. In accordance with instructions of Director J. Edgar Hoover, a memoranduft outlining the facts of the request was ‘prepared for approval of Hr. Hoover, or Mr. Tolaon, the Associate Director. Subsequently, the memorandum wae filed in the Asaiatant Director's office under a “Do Not File* procedure, and thereafter destroyed. In the field office, the SAC maintained a record of avproval ae @ contre] device in his office safe. At the next yearly field office inapection, a review of these records would ba made by the Inspector to ingure that the SAC wag not acting without prior FBIHG approval in Conducting surreptitious entries. Upon completion of this review, these records were destroyed. There if no central index, file, or document listing surreptitious entries conducted against domestic targets. To reconstruct these activities, it is necessary tO rely upon recollections of Special Agente who have knowlodge of such activities, and review of those files identified by recollection as being targets of surreptitious entries. Since policies and procedures followed in reporting of information resulting from a surreptitious entry were designed to conceal the activity from persons not having a néed to know, information contained in FBI files relating to entrica ies in most instances incomplate and difficult to identi fy. ‘ Reconstruction of instances of surreptitious entry through review of files and recollections of Special Agent personnel at PBIHO who hava knowledge of euch activities, show the following categories of targete and the approximate number of entries conducted against each: 2. At least fourteen domestic subversive targets were the subject of at least 238 entries from 1942 to April, 1968, In addition, at least thres domestic subversive targets ware the subject of numerous entries from October, 1952, to June, 1966. Since there exists no precise record of entries, “a are unable to retrieve an accurate accounting of their number, : ~2- r