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| ee ee ah nae LN j '* foyalty-security program of the Executive. Monday, June 17, P orf TO invest whether he « triple-barreled attack on (1) the artment of Justice and its Smith Act trial; (2) the free- w Congress inquisitions; asd (3) the hateful is already « historic landmark. ... The curtain ist closing on one of our worst periods.” 7. The Watkins case decided that it is not “pertinent” for « congressional committees, established for the investigation of un-American activities, to ask « witness to give informa- tion conceming persons known to him tw have-been members of the Communist Party. T Senn tan oll a Ty The courts have repeatedly said: "The power to legislate carries with it by necessary implication ample authority to obtain information needed in the rightful exercise of that power, and to employ compulsory fox that purpose.” Although many people consider the congressional investiga- tions inte Communism by the House Un-American Activities Committee |which was a particular target of the Watkins opin- ion] and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee [which wat ruled against in the subsequent decision of Flamer . U, 8.J may be considered as primarily the information type of inquiry, they have resulted in a considerable quantity of m- portant legislation. This includes the Smith Act, the Subver- sive Activities Control Act of 1950, the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Summary Suspension Act of 1950, ceriain sec- tions of the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act, the Immunity Act of 1954, the Communist Control Act of 1954 and con- siderable State legislation such as the United States Su- prom Courtapproved New York Feinberg and Marylend The repeal or the weakening of these anti-Communist laws and committees is in the forefront of the program of the Communist Party of the United States. Until the Watkins case, the Court had never interfered with the work of the House Un-American Activities Com- mittee, and had on four occasions specifically refused to set aside contempt convictions imposed on witnesses who balked at testifying before this Committee. Uni che Watldns cass, the Caust bad upheld the infosmes- tion function of legislative committees, and had always re- fused to fnterfere with the work of congressional committees investigating Commumism. Li » unanimous decision which was considered for more than two years before its pronouncement, the Supreme Court said: 2 Taj Toet hade. anand Last A PRUs COU, CARGO a gisists wisely of effectively in the absence of information g the conditions which the legislation ix intended to effect or change: and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite informa- tion—which not infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who do it.” in defending congressional power to investigate the Tone Pine seen dels bie Testine Dale Rrankfurter (then a Teapot Dome scandals, Mr. Justios Feliz Frankfurter (then = professor) wrote: oo “The question f not whether people's feelings here and there may be hurt, or names ‘dre through the mud’ as it is called, The real issue is .. the grave risks of V. 5. NEWS & WORLD REPOUT, Ag, 14, 1957 - | a i pt 1Gare Vom . . the power of investigation should be is because special privilege thrives in secrecy | and i destroyed by the rays of pitiless publicity.” In refusing to enjoin Senator Black's lobby-inquiry com. mittee from what was widely chatged fo be improper vise of the congressional power of exposure, the Court said: “it is tive discretion which is exercised, and that discretion, whether rightfully or wrongfully exercised, is not subject to wkerference by the {udiciary.” Hf t is proper for congressanel commitiess to investigate - businessmen, it is surely proper to investigate Communists. HE congressional inquiry inia dishonesty “ought not te be fet. tered by advance rigidities,” neither should congressional inquiries into disloyalty. The Watkins opinion points to the Royal Commissions of Inquiry ax something to be imitated by congressional com- mittees because of the coramissions’ “success in fulfilling their fact-finding missions without resort to coercive tactics. Canadian Law and Communists The report of the Canadian Royal-Commission on Espia- nage, which was created on Feb. 5, 1946, to investigate the charges of Igor Gouzenka, and which is the Royel Commie tion most neatly comparable in purpose to the House Une American AgtHvitiee Committers, reveala the following differences between the methods used by # Roya] Com- mission investigating subversion, and the methods used by a congressional cammittes investigating subversicn: 3. A Royal Commission can arrest and jail witnesses. A congressional committee has no such power. 2. A Royal Commission can hold witnesses without bail and incomumunicedo for many days and anti fter they are questioned. A congressional committee has no such power. 4. A Royal Commission can compel witnesses to testify and impose sanctions for refusing to testify. It does not recognize a “fifth amendment” or privilege against self in- crimination, as do our congressional committees. 4. A Royal Commission can have its police agents search witnesses’ homes and seize their papers. A congressional committee has oo such power. 5. A Royal Commision may forbid a witness to have his lawyer present at the hearing. Congressional committert 137 er uwWhp coe