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568 UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN CALIFORNIA Although the ‘‘ciear and present danger’’ standard (applied ix Schenck v. United States (19195, 249 U. S. 47) was given a somewhat restricted scope in Guillow v. New York (1925), 268 U. 8. 652, which upheld the New York Anarchy Act, the more recent decisions in Thomas v. Collins (1945), 323 U.S, 516; Thornhill v. Alabama (1940), 310 U.S, 88; Schnetderman v. United States (1943), 320 U.S. 118, and Bridges v. California (1941), 314 U. 8. 252, indicate that the ‘‘clear and present danger’’ standard must be met in formulating a measure that in any way restricts or hampers the freedom of religion, speech, press or peace- ful assembly. In the case of Schenck v. United States, the defendant was con. vieted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the armed forces of the United States and to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States while it was at war with Germany. The defendant had published a document circu. lated to men who had been called to service and allegedly calculated tu cause insubordination and obstruction. The court. affirmed the convie- tion of the defendant and stated that ‘‘The question in every case [involving freedom of speech] is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has the right to prevent.’? (p. 52.3 The Thomas case involved a Texas statute which sought to regi- late labor union organizers, In the Thornhill case, the court found that an Alabama statute prohibiting picketing was unconstitutional. In the Schneiderman case, the court reversed a lower court deci sion canceling the citizenship of Schneiderman on the grounds that he had illegally procured citizenship. It was alleged that Schneiderman al the time of his naturalization had fraudulently ‘concealed his member- ship in certain Communist organizations which were opposed to the prin- ciples of the Constitution. In the Bridges case, the court reversed the conviction of a laber leader who had been held in contempt of a state court, for causing the publication of a telegram from himself to the Seeretary of Labor. on the ground that the telegram constituted an attempt to influence the court’s decision since it contained a threat to strike. The determination of what constitutes a ‘‘clear and present dan- ger’’ presents the problem most difficult of solution. For, as stated by the re in Bridges v. California (cited above); “In Schenck v. United States, however, this court said that there must be determination of whether or not ‘the words used are used in such circumstances and are of euch a nature ag to create a clear and present danger that they will brist about the substantive evils,’ We recognize that this statement, however helpful, dot not comprehend the whole problem. As Mr. Justice Brandeis said in his cancurt™? opinion in Whitney Vv. California, 274 U. 8. 357, 874: ‘This court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a danger shall be deemed clear ; how remult the danger may be and yet be deemed present.’ * * * ({p. 261.) . “What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a workint principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imm' mence extremely high before utterances can be punished. Those eases do not purretl to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor de ¥¢ here.” (p. 263.) UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITL Ti. Srarurory anpD Jt In view of the difficulties inheren ind present danger’’ test, we believe th: extent of the power of the Legislature «to examine some of the more significar gnstruing and applying those statutes, of the statutes discussed will be found in at Page 581. We have not included considerati «uch a time, the clear and present dan ‘tan in the case of statutory regulatic of peace. Regulations concerning subversive nal forms: First, statutes that directly datutes that directly affect organizati if organizations. A. Svarutrory ReotLations raat D 1, Treason. Treason against the state, adhering to its enemies, or giving and punished by Section 37, California dix}, the definition being derived fro “tate Constitution. (For text, see Appe Misprision of treason, consisting | ‘reason without otherwise assenting tc punishable under Section 38, Califort Appendix.) 2. Insurrection and Rebellion. Ir -f active and open resistance to the ai ment. Section 143 of the California Mi zes the Governor to declare a state of ir fied ‘‘that the execution of civil or er resisted by bodies of men, or that any cr resist by force the execution of such p ‘ounty or city are unable or have fail laws’? and he may order into the serv ‘ext, see Appendix.} Section 145 of the Code provides for punishment of anyo! the Governor’s proclamation. (For tex 3. Sedition. Sedition may be gen of mouth, publication or otherwise, di: nent or the advocacy of its overthrow Statute which prohibits sedition as sui meludes criminal anarchy, display of nent, and criminal syndicalism. __ & Criminal Anarchy. Statutes 1- hibit the forceful and violent overthro Usually such statutes also prohibit the organized government. The New York Anarchy Act (for 1 Law, Secs. 160-166) provides, in part. advise or teach by word of mouth or