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(WN ACTIVITIES IN CALIFORNIA ndix with texts of some of the constitutiong ed or discussed. su ConstirutionaL Lamrrations s legislative powers in its legislat-re, tu he limitations expressed in the COnStitution gf | ch we are principally confronted, in consig, of state statutory regulations concerning y common to all of the states. essed in the form of guaranties of funds immunities, generally referred to ag the e, Article I of the Constitution guaran, ; zion (Sec. 4), freedom of speech (Sue 9}, | ce. 10), coupled with the reservation thet shall not be construed to impair or deay aple*? (Sec. 23). (For text, see appendis } ‘nited States furnishes similar guaranty | press, and of assembly (Amendt. 1}), at ‘the enumeration in the Constitutmg, | eenstrued to deny or disparaye othe mendt, 1X}, as limitations upon Cam $ pkocess clause of the Fourteenth Amen legislative action (Gitlow v. New Vet ! linnesota (1991), 283 TU. &. 697 ; Fed ‘3; Cantwell vy, Cannectlent (1930), k is discussed on page 570. Neary Mem | atpte providing for the abatement of g amiatory newspaper, magazine or othey ; am violated by the appellant who pe anea polis enforcing officers and areveta uties energetically. The court held the ‘afringement of the liberty of the preg \Wendment. DeJonge v. Orcqun w dp, Yamiwell v. Connecticut held that a Cat; ‘eGation of funds for religious purpamll, thgs Witnesses who solicited ce rfpamphlets, was unconstitntinnel @ eedom of religion) withodt om tions imposed by the several ation to the requirements of the cpipéssed in the federal constitubos matitution of the United Stata ed and applied in judicial 4 id’prevent subversive activities = is f relige gz an establishment 0 ; me the freedom of speech. or + ft me : ermble and to petition the govrtse* ¥ a“ UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN CALIFORNIA ‘Tort che freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer yeolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one May choose, ar an wrieted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language preventing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom ; and that a state in aercise of its police power may puuish those who abuse this freedom by utterances oi to the publie welfare, tending to incite ta crime, disturb the public peace, cainger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by fil means, is net open to question.” (p. 371.) Thus, in effect, the question before us is; Where does the individual's ~luni end and the state’s police powers begin? f. Tarse Limivations Tucpose Taree Basic STANDARDS These constitutional limitations impose three major requirements, .» basic Standards, for statutory regulation of subversive activities. (1) The due process clause requires that such a statute be suf- iiently explicit fo inform those who are subject to it, what conduct ntheir part will render them liable to its penalties, and be couched m terms that are not so vague that men of common intelligence must nevessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application Whitney v. California, 274 U.S, at p. 368}. (2) Such a statute must bear an appropriate relation to the ~afety of the state (Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. &, at p. 707}. While these two standards may give rise to some difficuities as to ‘tency of proof, they present no insurmountable obstacle to the “nent and enforcement of effective curbs upon subversive activities, The third standard, however, presents difficult problems. That -iard, resulting from the preferred position of the freedoms secured y First Amendment, is: ‘CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER"! (3) Any statute restricting those liberties must be justified by ‘lear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely but by ‘lear and present danger (Thamas v. Collins (1945), 323 U.S. 516), The Thomas case involved a Texas statute that required a labor . organizer to apply for an organizer’s card before soliciting any eers for his organization. The court held that statute unconstitu- alas applied to the president of the International Union U. A. W. al Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers}, ‘lsed an address with a general invitation asking persons present zembers of a labor union to support a certain local union. Tn holding ‘the statutory restriction of the liberties guaranteed by the First tdnent, as applied to the facts, was not justified, the court stated - ‘The rationa) connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, in other contexts might support legislation against attack on due process hk, will not auffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation, Accordingly, what- *rasion Would réstrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time wre, must have clear support in public danger, actual ar impending. Only the abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible Nmi- * tt in therefore in our tradition to allow the widest room for discussion, the “et range for its restriction, particularly when this right is exercised in con- ‘@ with peaceable aesembly.” (p. 530.3 567 These rights are not absolute. As stated by the United States rome Court in Whitney v. California (1927), 274 U. 8, 357: