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Saddam Hussein — Part 2
Page 77
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SE X1
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
In Reply, Please Refer to Baghdad Operations Center
File No. March 5, 2004
DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-20-2009
Interview Session Number: 12
Interview Conducted by: SSA _
SSA be
SSA bIC
Arabic/English Translation: LS
ref Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was
interviewed March 5, 2004 at a military detention facility at
Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein
provided the following information:
oa Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was
informed this session would be a continuation of the previous
discussions regarding Kuwait.
ps Hussein acknowledged that Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz met with US Secretary of State James Baker in Geneva,
Switzerland in January, 1991. From the perspective of the Iraqi
leadership, the goal of this meeting was to exploit any chance
for peace regarding the situation with Kuwait. When the
opportunity was made available to discuss this matter with an
American representative, Irag decided to pursue this avenue. The
Iraqi leadership believed that any results from this meeting
would "carry weight" in the international community.
#8) According to Hussein, Baker provided no solutions
for the Kuwaiti situation. Instead, Baker dictated to Aziz
certain steps that the United States wanted Iraq to accomplish
first. Baker added, "Otherwise, we'll take you back to the pre-
industrial age." Aziz told Baker that the accomplishment of
these steps would not be possible.
PS Hussein stated that the Kuwaiti issue needed to
have been placed inside the framework of international law. This
Matter should not have been reduced to one in which the strong
side (United States) dictated to the weak side (Iraq) the terms
of the agreement. Iraq sought a format which did not portray it
as defeated, but rather one showing respect for the Iraqi
military and its people.
Ss
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the
FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
a's
1 ne
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