◆ SpookStack

1631 -HQ-1462938 effective: > Provide the Air Force with detailed and accurate information about the targets. > It is necessary to brief the pilots about the targets descriptions and to make use of the aerial images. » Execute the strike at day break or a little later. > Dedicate the maximum effort (more than one airplane per target) and repeat air strikes with follow up airplanes, or make it a compound strike (The Special Ammunition, high explosive bombs, and surface to air missiles) using integrated or follow up bombing. > Strike all targets Simultaneously with the most effective effort. » Use the artillery after a suitable time (a few days) to strike the targets within the range. [attached as document #xx] On March 13, 1987, Iraqi Cabinet Minister HASHIM HASSAN AL-*‘AQRAWI (hereinafter AL-'AQRAWI) stated during a media interview, “The Iranians are trying to use these people [the Kurds] to carry out dirty missions, and since they know the geography of the area and its ins and outs, the Iranians use them merely as guides for the Khomeini Guards and the Iranian forces.” On March 18, 1987, the DMI responded to the Presidential Office through Memo, Number M1/Sh3/Q2/6414. The subject of the memo is, "Use of Special Ammunition" and contains the following: 1. The following are the available Capabilities to us for the use of the Special Ammunition directed at Khomeini Guard Bases and the bases of the saboteurs, AL-BARZANT Group - The First Branch. 2. The climate conditions do not permit the use of the (Sarin) agent at the present time because the target locations are covered with snow, which causes the agent to dissolve and transform into a non-poisonous substance. The same conditions apply to the (Tabun) agent. 3. We possess adequate (Mustard) agent. The