◆ SpookStack

1631 -HQ-1462938 Intelligence (DMI) submitted a Top Secret and Confidential intelligence report, M1/sh3/Q2/5809, to the Army Chief of Staff regarding Kurdish insurgent activity. The report identified the location of many of AL-BARZANI's bases, the cooperation and mutual assistance between AL-BARZANT's group and Iranian forces, and detailed acts of sabotage by AL-BARZANI's group. The report also noted that previous Iraqi aerial strikes had been ineffective because of the geography and size of the bases. [attached as document #Xx] The intelligence report was signed by Staff Major General SABIR ABD AL AZIZ HUSAYN AL-DURI (hereinafter SABIR), Director of the Istkhbarat or Iraqi DMI. Copies of the report were provided to the Presidential Secretary, the Secretary Bureau of the General Command of the Armed Forces, the RCC Committee of Northern Affairs, the RCC Deputy Bureau, the Office of the Ministry of Defense, and the Fifth Corps Headquarters. On March 11, 1987, based on DMI Intelligence Report 3809, the Army Chief of Staff, through Staff Major General TAREQ HUSSEIN NAJIB (hereinafter NAJIB), the Senior Secretary, directed the Fifth Corps Headquarters through memo Number 2786 to take measures necessary to limit the activities of saboteurs by destroying their essential bases. Copies of this memo were provided to the RCC Committee of Northern Affairs, Office of Ministry of Defense, and the DMI. [attached as document #XX]. On March 12, 1987, HUSSEIN responded to DMI’s Intelligence Report 5809. Ina Presidential Memo to the DMI, Number 7/G2/808/K, authored by Presidential Secretary AL-HUMMADI, HUSSEIN ordered the DMI and specialists to conduct a joint study for the use of "special ammunition" in a direct strike by the air force, army air assets, or artillery against the bases of Khomeini Guards and the First Branch of the AL-BARZANI Group. HUSSEIN's letter instructed the DMI “to do the necessary” and notify the President's office. [attached as document #XxX] SABIR stated that in 1987, the primary role of the DMI in the Northern Region of Iraq was to gather intelligence on Iranian forces. A secondary role was gathering intelligence on the Kurds and determining their relationship with the Iranians. SABIR believed the planning stages for the Anfal campaign occurred between 1985 and 1987. SABIR acknowledged that "special ammunition" was a term the President and other high level Iragi Government Officials, including himself, used to represent chemical weapons (CW). [SABIR interview, June 4, 2004].