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Saddam Hussein — Part 1
Page 74
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1631-HQ-1462938
volunteers existed in 1991. The translator read HUSSEIN an Iraq
Government communication from QUSAY HUSSEIN concerning the usage
of Kuwaiti prisoners as human shields. HUSSEIN stated that he
had no information about this letter, and answered only, “I
answered” when informed that American forces had recovered the
document from an Iraq Government building. HUSSEIN asked whether
the captives discussed in this communication were ever questioned
about being held in Iraqi Captivity or being used as human
shields. HUSSEIN stated that Iraq released all the Kuwaiti
captives. When informed that the document was dated March 14,
2003, HUSSEIN stated, "It is a forgery. It is impossible." He
suggested the communication be examined closely to determine
authenticity, and added that he thought it was dated 1991.
HUSSEIN stated if the document is truly dated 2003, it isa
forgery, and added that Iraq did not have captives in 2003.
HUSSEIN stated QUSAY HUSSEIN was not the type of person to "make
up things." He reiterated that experts in the United States and
in Iraq should scrutinize this document for authenticity.
[HUSSEIN interview, March 11, 2004, interview].
HUSSEIN stated that HASHEM, and SALEH, Second Corps
Commander, represented Iraq at the cease fire talks during the
first Gulf War. Their positions and viewpoints were the same as
those of the Iraqi leadership: to secure a cease fire and to
start the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. HUSSEIN stated
Iraq had no goal of continuing the war and desired a cease fire.
When questioned about other items discussed by Iraq at
the 1991 cease fire talks, HUSSEIN stated he did not remember any
additional Iraqi requests other than the withdrawal of foreign
forces from their territory. In HUSSEIN's opinion, the fighting
would have continued without this withdrawal. HUSSEIN denied
knowing that Iraq asked for and received permission to continue
flying helicopters. He further denied knowing the purpose of
such an Iraqi request.
AL-MAJID claimed he was summoned to an Iraqi leadership
meeting on August 7, 1990 with HUSSEIN and other Iragi leaders.
At the conclusion of the meeting, HUSSEIN announced to everyone
that AL-MAJID would go to Kuwait. At the time, SABAWI HASAN
IBRAHIM AL-TIKRITI (hereinafter SABAWI), HUSSEIN's brother, was
already in Kuwait. HUSSEIN's declaration to the Iraqi leadership
authorized AL-MAJID and SABAWI to "manage" Kuwait. AL-NUMAN was
appointed Governor of Kuwait and was "included" in the security
plans.
The work in Kuwait was divided into two parts; SABAWI
73
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