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women and young girls.” Id. One of these accounts named an actual young woman, resulting in defendant’s prosecution under § 875(c) for interstate communications containing threats to injure another person. Id. The court considered whether these messages, which were not sent directly to the woman who was the purported victim, constituted true threats. It concluded they did not: To determine what type of action Congress intended to prohibit, it is necessary to consider the nature of a threat. At their core, threats are tools that are employed when one wishes to have some effect, or achieve some goal, through intimidation. This is true regardless of whether the goal is highly reprehensible or seemingly innocuous. For example, the goal may be extortionate or coercive.... Additionally, the goal, although not rising to the level of extortion, may be the furtherance of a political objective. ... Finally, a threat may be communicated for a seemingly innocuous purpose. For example, one may communicate a bomb threat, even if the bomb does not exist, for the sole purpose of creating a prank. However, such a communication would still constitute a threat because the threatening party is attempting to create levity (at least in his or her own mind) through the use of intimidation. .... Although it may offend our sensibilities, a communication objectively indicating a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm cannot constitute a threat unless the communication also is conveyed for the purpose of furthering some goal through the use of intimidation. ... If an otherwise threatening communication is not, from an objective standpoint, transmitted for the purpose of intimidation, then it is unlikely that the recipient will be intimidated or that the recipient's peace of mind will be disturbed. Even if a reasonable person would take the communications between [defendant] and [the recipient] as serious expressions of an intention to inflict bodily harm, no reasonable person would perceive such communications as being conveyed to effect some change or achieve some goal through intimidation. Quite the opposite, [they] apparently sent e-mail messages to each other in an attempt to foster a friendship based on shared sexual fantasies. Id. at 1495-96. Under either standard, Fenton’s statements did not constitute threats. As in Bellrichard, there was simply no connection between Leventry, the recipient of the communication, and 10 AO 72A (Rev. 8/82)