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es 7 BMAR 5 . Toleon._........ . E. A. Tanim..... F Amey ee oliallythat| command of the. wal seid) oo teow oT againat, ar people should guard invade Japan," the Journal seid| == | wnee sneral MacArthur . from com. mand of the.American forces that “In. view ‘of the superb Teadér- ship he has | urnished, thé signifi- » Hendon... will invade Japan. * an - The future -of- the : Americ general, who has consistently: ad- vanced with’ lowest. losses‘‘‘al- though . negleéted: and- under-sup- |would seem that there’ should bef. ; Mr. ctesas vesnee no question‘ about “his ‘continued ; leadership. However, Tepdrts'aref == mse Gandy..._.__.. Plied, "has ‘been ‘a matter. of]current that the plans for the in- sleces cnet eeees cegese speculation ‘ever since he dramatt-] vasion, which have been approved;] “ . cally fulfilled ‘his promise - to-re-| turn to.the Philippines.:;: :.— 'Politiéal Angle Recalled | __ MacArthur himself took cogni- expedition.” lzance of speculation that he will! Navy's Help Ay shat “ be “through” ‘after beration of | N°*!’s Help Appreciated.” ¢: the Philippines in a statement at| ‘The’ publication tes: thet no Manila leaving his future up to one ‘realizes more than MbcAr commander in chief, Presi- it Roosevelt... - oe thur. the value of the Navy'acon- tribution to his successes, MacAr-. thir’s. co-operation with “Admiral Nimitz had been‘ close and highly ‘The President had not.- been diy disposed toward Mac- ur from Pearl Harbor. be- cause, as he confided to intimates, he feared that the general might oppose him in the 1944 presi- dential race. Not until it was clear that MacArthur had no bolitical ambitions did. Mr. Roose- vel§ confer with. the hero of Ba- war; itadded. tm “Evaluating the ‘achievements . of the co-ordinating services,- we » ‘find that responsible . for them ’ taan and the Southwest Pacific... MacArthur has ciware ote In his Manila statement Mac-| and always has practiced. .,There Arthur made it clear that he de-| were other activitios Lo employed fires to go. on-to Tokyo. There] _sfticient reconnaissanes * fran has been no ord from the White the outset of the campaign, swift. ever the Penida ent, HOW: | movement ‘toward ‘the oblective ha ever, the Pres nferenee in an ity | Concentration of personnel at crit: te the Big Three conference in south-| ical ‘points, immobilization ‘of the Ath ties may clarify Mac-| cremy, striking with Mastaer, Arthur's future on his ‘return.’ 7 power ‘of fire and shock, ci ee, ~ F. D. ; nera fp plo on rapi | fearlessly ». Falled to Cor . stulate - -.- [Of every advantage gained. °° >> In the meantime it was .con- “All these things. entered into. sidered significant that the White the operations which enabled ‘the House had not sent a message of xen io ty : . : we over Manila, an ey,. would be b ; f employed should he be permitted’ | ol Ae W/ 1, Ye A Congratulations to MacArthur on Japan." And because he.knows NOD RECOM ommonwealth. The failure. to end a Message to MacArthur was é more noticeable because esidential . messages were sent . Eisenhower on _jandings | in Tica, Italy and France, a “The American people should e taking of Manila, although me was sent to Osmena of the them thoroughly and has pi by. their use, he is the ‘m yet P 1945 i WASHINGTON TIMES-HERALD. NO. Son bay MORNING EDITION y -m -¥s a