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UNR ~ . | M-2E-Sb Such was the case in the decision to move some 120,000 Japanese- Americans from their homes and farms on the Weet Casct ta entcnacian 3 ane farms On the West Coust to rclocution centers. It was a tragic upheaval which Hoover looked upon a6 a niix- ture of politics and hysteria and not as an urgent measure of national defense. : The FBI Director first heard of the evacuation proposal when he was called to the office of Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau on t the evening of December 10 for a talk with the Secretary and two other Treasury officials. A memorandum of the mecting written by Hoover to Attorney Gencral Biddle tells the basic story: - Se . . » The Secretary stated that he had been in communication with his representatives in San Francisco and as a‘result had ascertained that the task which they were carrying on [freezing Japanese assets and busincsses] was an cnormous one and that he believed more drastic measures should be taken in order to adequately cover and complete it. The Secretary then put in a call to Mr. X, one of his representatives in San Francisco, and this conversation was heard by all in the Sceretary’s office . . . It was the opinion of Mr. X that there should be a round-up of the Japanese in San Francisco, Las Angeles und in the bay citics of San Francisco, as well as in certain sections of the San Joaquin Valley . . . The Secretary inquired of me as to whether this could be done... I suggested to Secretary Morgenthau that he call you by phone. I told the Secretary that I felt that you would be reluctant to approve any such program unless there were sufficient facts upon which to justily the f cases of the persons arrested, as [ believed you would be opposed to any; “drag-net" or “round-up” procedure. I pointed oul to the Secretary that, Ly . Excerpt from page 18 of “as "The FBI Story, A Report to the People" by Don Whitehead o> ENCTOSURY L |