Amerithrax — Part 27

108 pages · May 08, 2026 · Document date: May 24, 2005 · Broad topic: Terrorism · Topic: Amerithrax · 102 pages OCR'd

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/24/2005 violate USAMRIID protocol, yet at the moment his concerns were validated, he took no actions toward addressing the problems for the benefit of USAMRIID. £ motivated by a concern for {__] why did IVINS not pe inform of the presumptive positive results from i IVINS confirmed during an interview that he did notwi m of his findings; however, reasons for not telling were not provided.*4 The assessment by IVINS that the levelo contamination within the office was not a health risk to himself, did not diminish the significance of finding contamination outside of the hot suites. IVINS gave conflicting accounts of exactly when he informed [[~Jabout the environmental survey. In IVINS! 15-6 sworn statement, he indicated that he mentioned to that he was going to check[_______]ldesk in December and to after he had done so that about half of the cultures were suspicious for_anthrax. During other interviews, IVINS stated that he told[____—iof the swabbing after the fact. ; Ltion to expressing minimal uneasiness with regard to safety concerns,[___|presented a cavalier attitude with respect to the results of IVINS' December swabbing results. ] SPILL INCIDENT IN SUITE B3 ON APRIL 8, 2002 ° Description of Apri inci i [ [| On April 8, 2002, removed bé eight 2-liter flasks containing B.a. spores from a shaker b7C incubator in room[ _Jof suite B3. The flasks, containing 2 erythromycin-resistant (erm+)'B.a., were yin voon[ TL two trips b7F on a ° aboratory in room of suite B3. put the flasks in the hood and noticed that the paper tape towe the cap of one of the flasks was discolored on the inside. oticed dried media on the sides of several of the flasks. notified everyone in the suite of the otential exposure and bleach £ within minutes. were sent by to the ward for nasal swabs and evaluation.* b6é ° Results o uite B3 environmental survey bac [ep nsteucte to perform surveillance cultures of multiple rooms inside the B3 suite on April 9-11, 2002, to determine the extent of contamination resulting from the spill.** Surface contamination by B.a. was identified in several ’ [|

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/24/2005

violate USAMRIID protocol, yet at the moment his concerns were
validated, he took no actions toward addressing the problems for
the benefit of USAMRIID.

£ motivated by a concern for {__] why did IVINS not pe
inform of the presumptive positive results from i

IVINS confirmed during an interview that he did notwi m
of his findings; however, reasons for not telling were not

provided.*4 The assessment by IVINS that the levelo
contamination within the office was not a health risk to himself,

did not diminish the significance of finding
contamination outside of the hot suites.

IVINS gave conflicting accounts of exactly when he
informed [[~Jabout the environmental survey. In IVINS!
15-6 sworn statement, he indicated that he mentioned to
that he was going to check[_______]ldesk in December and to
after he had done so that about half of the cultures were

suspicious for_anthrax. During other interviews, IVINS stated
that he told[____—iof the swabbing after the fact. ;

Ltion to expressing minimal uneasiness with
regard to safety concerns,[___|presented a cavalier

attitude with respect to the results of IVINS' December swabbing
results. ]

SPILL INCIDENT IN SUITE B3 ON APRIL 8, 2002

° Description of Apri inci i [ [|
On April 8, 2002, removed bé
eight 2-liter flasks containing B.a. spores from a shaker b7C

incubator in room[ _Jof suite B3. The flasks, containing 2
erythromycin-resistant (erm+)'B.a., were yin voon[ TL two trips  b7F

on a ° aboratory in room of suite
B3. put the flasks in the hood and noticed that the paper
tape

towe the cap of one of the flasks was discolored on
the inside. oticed dried media on the sides of several
of the flasks. notified everyone in the suite of the

otential exposure and bleach £
within minutes. were sent by

to the ward for nasal swabs and evaluation.*

b6é

° Results o uite B3 environmental survey bac
[ep nsteucte to perform surveillance
cultures of multiple rooms inside the B3 suite on April 9-11,

2002, to determine the extent of contamination resulting from the
spill.** Surface contamination by B.a. was identified in several

’ [|