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t gesting neutralization anl politiciangs™ own to sup- port neutraliom are in exile or in presi. Under such conditions it is obvions that a genuine reficction of pop: nlar wishes can be obtained only when the United States decides to stand aside and perinit al] contending faction to vie for popular eupport. the PP. nee wate Admittedly. if 2 is sufficient support among people, Communist elements might, well gain control of a freely elected governent, a fact of life which we should he prepared 10 face. There is, however, eonsider- able evidence that a genuinely representative South Victnam governuient, whether Communist or non-Com- munist, would opt for peace and neutrality, perhaps under international guarantece. Jt is also likely that North Vietnam, or even a Communist-oriented, unified Vietnam, would welcome an opportunity to muniniuze its dependence on China. the historical “imperialist” of Asia. Consolidation of the complementary econo- mies of North and South Vietnam would help to acconi plich this by permitting the Southern rice surplus to fill the North's rice deficit, at the same time catering to the nationalistic passion which so dominates Viet namese thought. The recent fissures in the Communist bloc suggest that nationalism will increasingly assert itwelf over monolithic Communism, and a unified or fedsrated Vietnam would enjoy much greater mancuver- ability to pursue such a course. Tine precise form which any negotiated solution might take can hardly Ie predicted at this time. Public etate- “at. hy the National as cunbacman ae MEER athe -: bulk of the insurgent forces, concentrate on de- nands for a erssation of United States intervention in south Vietnam affairs. According to Georges Chaflard of Le Moride, the Front favors a neutral belt to include South Vietnam, Cambodia. and Laos and docs not want South Vietnam to become dependent upon North Vict- nam. “hher rebel elements, more closcly ‘oriented loward North Vietnam. give high priority to unification of the country. Liher anon F ront, The continuing crisis gettiled uatel BOtaCi UT paeighhoring Laos cannot he in there has heen a settlement im ¥ yeinam, nor are our touchy relations with Cambodia likely to improve eo kong as we obstruct efforts to bring peace along her frontier. Cambodia has twice complained to the United Nations shout United States violation: of her border: first. charging that Americans participated in a hombing mission which killed 17 Cambodians. and second, charging us with the aerial spraying of destructive cheinicals over Cambodian territory. Such “Sneidents” dau. po good but great harm; they could even serve to ignite # major conflict. The idea of reconvening the 1954 Geneva Conference which onded the French-Indochinese conflict has been revived periodically, most reeently by Uo Thant (July 9, 1964,. The United States response to this suggestion ft * . . * has ‘seen eesentially thf” @Ril the existing agreements are pected no purpo: 2-ould be served hy another conf ‘renee. Considerable doubt is cast on the sincerity ot this re- aponee in view of the well known fact that some of the moat Llatant violations of the Geneva accords have been commitied by the United States or with its encourage- ment. Probahly the most crucial term of the Geneva Cease-fre Agreement was the provision for nationwide unifying elections to be held hy June 1956. The South Vietnam government, correctly afraid that it would lose such an election, if for no other reason than me emaller population, adamantly refused to honor thie provision in 1956. and has steadfastly continued to refuse to per- mit uoification elections despite periodic demands for these elections by the North. (Both South Vietnam and the United States hide behind the technically correct claim that they never signed the Geneva agreements.) Gther provisions of the Agrecuient prohibited the intre- duction into Vietnam any additional military pereonne} (Article 16) or armaments (Article 17) and forbade the establishment of new military bases (Article 18). By 1956 both North and South Vietnam had heen found guilty of violating these conditions. The massive build- up of United States forces in 1901. including the con- struction of jet air bases, was all done in knowing vio- lation of this Agreement. Another approach has been that of General De Gaulle. Ve proposes that the United States. the Soviet Union. China, and Franee withdraw from Indochina and that a Massive economic and technical aid program be eub- stituted for the fighting. This proposal, and indved the entire idea of taking the Vietnamese conflict te the conference tahle was summarily rejected by President Johnson (press conference, July 24. 1964; within 24 hours after the Genera] suggested it. Such haste indi- cated a rigid and unthinking résponre, Any course of action is risky, but almost nonc is more risky than the one we are following, Ae mature indi. viduals Americans must realize that we camot dictate to every corner of the globe, nor do we win respect for ourselves by brandishing our nuclear arsena) wheneve: we cannot have our way. Forces in existence before the discovery of North America as well as forces as fresh as post-World War JJ nationalism. are at work in the Vietnamese conflict. An American-backed. unrepre- sentative government can temvorarily distort the rela- live strengths of theee forces. but until they are allowed to assert themselves and to find their support among & free population, unchecked guerrilta warfare, accor: panied by a political instability which cannot be re- stricted to Vietnam's border, will continue to sap United States energies ani) prestige, to irritate United States politics. bath domestic and international. to aggravate the racia] polarization of the world. and to stoke the flames of World War IST. Published as an educational service by TURN TOWARD PEACE, INC. Additional copies available; send orders to Cooper Station Box 401, New York, New York 10003 Single copies $015 100 copies 10 copies 1.00 500 copies $ 7. 30 ae i] S 3000 copies $50.00 A joint effort of some seventy voluntary organizations to find solutions to international problems which do not invcive threats of war or surrender of freedom or democratic values, TURN TOWARD PEACE does not itself take policy positions on specific igsues, euch as the situation in Vietnam, but seeks to provide background information and to stimulate the kin of discussion necesSary to find constructive answers. This paper is part of that effort. It was prepared at the requesi of twenty organizations which discussed and agreed upon the great need of American citizens for adequate background information on Southeast Asia and Vietnam. ” - — . Z * wy ag