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Enthusiastic United States suppo “© provided far a variety of inhuman pacifieation t8.. es of dubious ef- fectiveness. Entire rural communities were arbitrarily resettled in prisom-like camps to present their pro- viding succor to the rebellious forces. New chemical- warfare tacties. introduced to defaliate wooded arcas. had the side effect of destroying crops. a fact which did not deter us frow using them. Brutal tortures and the burning af entire villages were undertaken at a means of extracting information about Viet Cong and other rebels from sympathetic peasants. Practices whose cruelty revolts civilized men and which niuet certainly be considered “crimes againat humanity” if that tecur has any weaning whatsoever becanie standard pro- cedure. Not eutprisingh. the more destructive and grotesque the combat tactics. the greater became the resentment of the local peasaniry which had to bear the wrath of both antagonists (more than eighty per cent of Vietnani's population is rural), Fhe area of the country under rebel control continued 1p increase, and the number of guerrilla recruite to the rebels’ cause grew to the currently estimated twenty-five thousand, with avi: pathizere, perhaps running into the millions. providing food and shelter. Defections from the South Vietnamese army itself have beeome increasingly a problem. and erhinent spokesmen ft a lipalatahle facts were with- hel fand the truth 2° cried.” The shifting pronounce- ments ond blarant (Mitradietions of Seeretary McNa- mata have exasperated members of the Senate as well ay the press and the puldic. Optimism and gloom have played tag in official W ashingtan tiews since early 1961, Troop cuthacks have been made. only to be reversed within a few months. MeNamara’e predictions, reiter- ated as reeenthy as February 1964, of eccentially total United States military withdrawal by 1945. have been replaced by an announcement (July 27, 1964) of a Give thousand man inerease in aur Vietnam military mis. aion and by talk of twenty mere years of warfare. Siinflar contradictions can be found between the erm pathetic support which rebel forees abviously receive from the rural populace throughout South Vietnam and the claim of Preuier General Khanh that “the people have called for the war ta he carried to the North.” Guecrilla insurgents ean suceeed only when the sur- rounding population provides them aid and cover, a fact which acconnts both for the sucerss af the rebel forces in the South and the failure of atiempts to carry out subversion in the North. Specalating en the wis dam of United States-eponsored infiltration of the North, the New York Times’ wilitary apecialist, Hanron Bald. win. eaid: “The population of North Vietouit ie un Ikely to be friendly.” Actually, the commander of most of the rebels’ weapons are reported to coneist of United States arms which have been captured by, sold or given to the rebel forces. South Vietnam's Air Force announced at a preee cone ference on Jaly 22. 1964, in the presence of top-rauking om “et There is no way to distinguish pro. from anti-gevern- ment sympathizers among-t the local populace. The tali, faic-skinned Americans are the only obvious in- traders, a fact which gives eloquent credibility to the widespread charge that we are the new colonialists. To tne Vietnamese who watch their country being ra- vaged and their people being mutilated by the gir power and niy-terious chemical agente which we have supplied, the idea that the United Stotes may be using Vietnamese territory io achieve American objectives becoames increa-ingl. convincing. Our protestations that we are fighting for liberty ring hollow when it is only by the force of United States support that the unpopu- Jar South Vietnamese governments hare been able to achieve and retain power. Our exhortations that Com- muniem mist be defeated seem irrelevant in an area where other foes ace ouch more tangible. More re: cently. our talk of introducing nuclear weapons awakens latent meniories with racist overtones potentially more explosive than the A-homh itacif. UN, Secretary Gen- eral U Thant. himself a Burmese, even felt obliged 10 warn the Cnited States bow such a decision would be viewed ly Asians. He said: Suh aetion is sure to generate widespread resentment and bitter criticism. particularly from quarters which so fac have nut heen very vocal. and have not been very outspoken recasding the situation in Southeast Asia, In 145. when atone bombs were dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, there was a widespread feeling in many parts of Asia {hat these deadly atomie bembs were dropped on Japanese cities because the fapanese wer nonwhites. ’ The American public has been intentionally victimized throughout this entire adventure, The genuine comples- ity ot the situation has been made partisularly unintel- ligible hy distorted reparting and a partial blackout on news from the areca. apparentiy at the instigation of Washington authorities, According to a recent New York Times editarial (July 29, 19641, “the Govern: meat’s negative —indeed repressive and distorjed—news policies obscured both the purposes and progress of the war, The public was not only misinformed by Gov- a , + ” United States officers, that combat teams have heen jofiltrated inside North Vietnam for at feast three years, without success. Massive acria) attack on North Vietnam, on the other hand, requires na popular aupport whateoever. At the game prese conferciee on Taly 22nd. Air Commodore Ky announced that thirty pilots bad been epecially trained ta bomb North Vietnam. “We could go this afternoon,” he said. “T cannot assure you that all af North Vietnam would he destroyed, but Hanoi would eerlainly be destroyed.” , The extent of the direri invelvenient of the North in the inaurgency activitier has in fact heen a aubject of considerable disagrecsirnt among knowledgeable observers. As recently as March 1964. Pulitzer-Prize- winning reporter David Halhectam. of the Vew York Times, reported: The war is largely a cealliet of Southerners fought on Southern land. Ne capture af North Vietnamese in the South has come to Jigh.. By mid-1964 charges of actual intervention of North Victnumese military forces in the Southeen struggle were being heard with increasing frequenes. Adthough not yct substantiated, slinidd such reports in fact prove true they would certainly indicate a widening of the framework within which this civil war is being fought. Key United States leaders hive admitted. however, tat aeria) hombardment of North Vietnam would. by it self, be unlikely to improve substantially the situation in the South. There are aleo significant by-products which deserve ae- ious consideration with respect to bombing Notth Virt- nam. Such action would further fasten upon the United States the image of unprovoked destrover of Asian peoples and their property. It would accelerate the conversion of Vietnamese Nationalists to pro-Commin- iste, a shift which our obtuse policy has been sevom- plishing in the South for quite some tine. Furtheruure, such au attack would push North Vietnam firmly into the arma of China to which she would obviou-ly hase to turm for support. Thue we would accomplish for