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“FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95) ¢ . © . fy 315B-HO-1448534 Continuation ofFD-3020F __Ali Hasan Al-Majid ,On 4/3/2004 — » Page The ‘interviewer played a portion o£ a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 9:35 to 10: 47 of the tape. of this audiotape was obtained terviewer from previously re. described. Per FBI LS a translation o is audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A; The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al- ~-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is undated, but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.) : : Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a -recording of his voice and his words. He added that this is probably the same meeting with Khazraji and Zareb, among others, discussed during a previous interview. In the tape, Al-Majid stated that he is discussing "caring for the families of saboteurs" and is not discussing executing them. When questioned about his statement "I put his message to my head" and his seeming disregard of a message from Saddam Hussein to caré for the saboteurs, Al-Majid asked, "I filed it in the back of my mind? I didn't listen to?" Al- -Majid noted that.if his intention had been to kill the people of the north, then why would he have "gathered" them and brought them closer to him. He. stated that he would have sent the individuals to prohibited areas and the Army would have killed them. Al- -Majid denied that a hypothetical act such as this is similar or identical to the actual order given by Al- -Majid to "deport" the first- ~degree relatives of saboteurs. to the prohibited zones, as discussed in a previous interview. Al-Majid stated that he had no intention to kill the families of the saboteurs. Hé pointed out that there were three ‘levels or stages of the process within the five kilometer zones around cities, the only areas for which he had responsibility. First, the gathering, then the declaration of forbidden zones, and finally, the establishment of a "certain level of trust between us . and them." Al-Majid noted there was "not much trust." Neither the Army nor the administration was allowed to go into the prohibited areas. Once trist was established, however, the residents of the northern region were allowed to farm in the prohibited areas.