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. % * _ FD-302a (Rev, 10-6-95). oo . 315E-HQ-1448534-302 Continuation of FD-302 of -Ali_ Hasan Al-Majid _ On 03/20/2004 _, Page After the deportation or. collectivization process began,. Al-Majid believed that the Kurds and Iranians felt threatened. The Iranian, insurgents previously would have had to walk only approximately five km in mountainous terrain to bordering villages ‘ where refuge or assistance was provided: However, because of the deportation process, this distance was increased and it became more difficult for insurgents to cross mountainous terrain without safe havens. Al-Majid ‘agreed that most. Kurds did riot want to move or leave their homes. Those that did were seeking improvements such as electricity, refrigerators, and school teachers. If Kurds: refused to be relocated, they were forced into vehicles and taken with their belongings to government housing complexes. Once the - villagers were deported, the villages were Teveled so as not to become safe havens for saboteurs. ‘Al-Majid stated these were not his personal orders but ‘those of the Iraqi’ government as it cost millions of dinars and required the efforts of all of the government's ministries. Interviewers played a portion of an audiotape of Al- Majid'’s voice in Arabic. (This. tape is described in a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report titled "Genocide in Iraq: ‘The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al- Majid Tapes, as a recording of a Northern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. According to HRW, the tape is undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.) In the tape, Al-Majid discusses the previous decision to collectivize and destroy villages. Al—-Majid acknowledged that the tape contains his words and his voice. He acknowledged that he ordered the déstruction of homes within the. prohibited zones after the residents were removed. Al-Majid acknowledged that he held a separate meeting wherein ‘he instructed.those under his command that no house was to remain standing within the prohibited zones: Al- Majid also acknowledged that he informed his subordinates that he would. tour the prohibited zones and if his orders were not carried out completely, he would hold the section commander responsible. During a portion of the same tape, Al-Majid stated that he discussed with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, the failure of Tali' Al-Duri, 5th Army Corps Commander, to carry out his orders. Al-Majid claimed that this portion of. the tape demonstrates that he did not have authority over the military, as Al-Majid could only complain about military officers that failed to carry out their orders. Al-Majid claimed that if he did have