◆ SpookStack

* The Task Force met with document exploitation experts from the FBI and other ' Intelligence Community agencies to discuss the exploitation, dissemination, and tracking of leads from materials seized in the raids in Saudt Arabia in May and June of 2003 * The Task Farce received quality analytical assessments that were produced through timely information sharing between all the agencies invalved, requiar meetings and consultation among analysts from all the agencies, and close peer-to-peer coordination of analytic assessments across those agencies. Response to Terrorist Threats Over the 2003 Holiday Season In December 2003, the U.S. Intelligence Community became concerned about the possibility of near-term attacks in the homeland from al-Qa'ida Strategic and tactical intelligence pointed to the possibility of attacks during the holiday season, and raised concerns. about the use of foreign flights, threats. to the energy sector, and the possibility of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks. The FBI response was quick, thorough, based on centrally controlled, intelligence-based investigations, and focused on disrupting possible terrorist activity in the horneland. We undertook the following steps to address the heightened threat environment: * As soon as FBI Headquarters received the threat information, we immediately stood up a command post in SIOC to provide around-the-clock threat analysis and to maintain contact with appropriate JTTFs and Legal Attaché offices. * Counterterrorism. analysts immediately began a full review of all Sunni and Sma international - terrorism cases from the past six months to determine if there were any previously unrecognized links. We used ail the software search tools at our disposal, including link analysis, fo énsure that there was no. evidence of a connection to any existing terrorism ~ case. * We directed all 56 FBi field offices to take $pecrfic actions, including standing up 24/7 command posts, gathering intelligence through interviews and other means, and working with local agencies to incréase security, share information, and assist the investigation. * Senior Headquarters executives, including the Director, the Deputy Director, and CTD managers, regularly communicated with the SACs in each of the affected field offices via secure video teleconferencing. * We issued several bulletins and advisories relating to these threats to state and municipal law enforcement. * We established a Headquarters task force to vet the passenger manifests of certain in- bound and out-bound flights to identify potential terrorists. Representatives from DHS, CIA, and NSA met at FB! Headquarters and established a protocol for vetting flight manifests through the NUTTF. Task force members used the FB! data warehouse and NSA, CIA, and Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (/CE) databases in the vetting process. * The NJTTF facilitated frequent communications with domestic and foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners. We regularly met with representatives of the French and 68 MISC DOC. #5 000000407 Sa date EN at ee Et Nae Fy ay yb batt rie he