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Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Operations The Bureau historically measured its performance, to a large extent, by the number of criminals it arrested. While useful for traditronal law enforcement, where the primary objective is arrest and prosecution, this standard is under-inclusive as applied to counterterrorism, where the primary objective is to neutralize terrorist threats. It only captures that subset of terrorist threats that are neutralized by arresting terrorists and prosecuting them with charges of criminal terrorism It fails to capture the terrorist threats we neutralize through means other than forrnal terrorism prosecutions — such.as deportation, detention, arrest for non-terrorism charges, seizure of financial agate Et wan ea ol assets, and the sharing of information with foreign governments for their use in taking action & "E against terrorists within their borders ee A more useful measure is one we have used in organized crime cases — the number of i disruptions and dismantlements. This measure counts every time we — either by ourselves or with our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence cammunities — conduct an operation. which disables, prevents, or interrupts terrorist fundraising, recruiting, training, or operational planning. Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has participated in dozens of such operations, disrupting a wide variety of domestic and international terrorist undertakings. While the number of disruptions is significant the most telling measure of our progress is the manner in which we have conducted individual operations. consistent with our prevention mission. The extent of our transformation is most clearly seen in the approach we take when confronting specific terronst threats Our approach to these operations demonstrates the extent to which coordination and prevention through the development of actionable intelligence nave become our guiding operational principies. The following ts a sampling of our investigative activities that show the various dimensions of our counterterrorism capabilities. The particulars of the first two operations have been publicly discussed, and the last two have resulted in criminal charges and have thereby been made public While we have briefed Congressional Committees and the Commission on other investigations and terrorist disruptions that resulted in no criminal prosecutions and have thus remained classified, we cannot discuss them in this unclassified document. The first two examples show our coordinated responses to periods of heightened threat oe Riles acts, End of Summer Task Force During the investigation into the May 12, 2003, bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, significant Intelligence was developed suggesting the existence of a plot to attack the U.S. horneland. This information, combined with other threat indicators, pointed to an increased threat of terrorist attacks for the end of summer. * in response, we established the “End of Summer Task Force” made up of agents and analysts to examine the threat. The Task Force worked closely with other members af the Intelligence Community to coordinate operational and intelligence elements. * FBI and Intelligence Community entities held bi-weekly meetings to share significant findings, operational information, and intelligence assessments EMISC DOC. #5 ae 67. 000000406