◆ SpookStack

For a variety of historical reasons, the Bureau had not developed this intelligence capacity pnor to September 11, 2001, While the FB! has always been the world’s best collector of informaticn, we never established the infrastructure to exploit that information fully for its intelligence value. Individual FBI agents have always analyzed the evidence in their particular cases, and then used that analysis to guide their investigations. But the FBI, as an institution, nad not elevated that analytical process above the individual case or investigation to an overall effort to analyze intelligence and strategically direct intelligence collection against threats across all of our programs. The attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the need to develop an intelligence process for the Counterterrorism Program and the rest of the Bureau. Since then, we have undertaken to build the capacity to fuse, analyze, and disseminate our terrorism-related intelligence, and to direct investigation activities based on our analysis of gaps in our callection against national intelligence requirements, That effort has proceeded in four stages. Stage 1 Initial Deployment of Analysts Our first step was to increase the number of analysts working on counterterrorism. | mmediately after the September 11, 2001, attacks, we temporarily reassigned analysts from the Criminal Investigative Division and Counterintelligence Division to various units in. the Counterterrorism Division. In July 2002, 25 analysts were detailed from the CIA to assist our counterterrorism efforts. Many of these analysts provided tactical intelligence analysis; others provided strategic "big picture” analysis. All of ther worked exceptionally hard and helped us analyze the masses of data generated in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks. These deployments were a temporary measure, but the progress made, the confidence gained, and the lessons learned during this period started us down the road toward a functioning intelligence analysis operation. We also established the College of Analytical Studies to help train and develop our own cadre of analysts. Stage 2 Office of Intelligence On December 3, 2001, we established the Office of Intelligence (O/) within the Counterterrorism Division. The Ol was responsible for establishing and executing standards for recruiting, hiring, training, and developing the intelligence analytic workforce, and ensuring that analysts are assigned to operational and field divisions based on intelligence priorities. Recognizing that intelligence and analysis are integral to all of the Bureau's programs, in February 2003, we moved the Ol! out of the Counterterronsm Division and created a stand-alone Ol, headed by an Executive Assistant Director, to provide centralized support and guidance for the Bureau's intelligence functions. Stage 3 Intelligence Program The next step in our intelligence integration was to elevate intelligence functions to program- level status, instituting centralized management and implementing a detailed blueprint for the intelligence Program. We articulated a clear mission for the Intelligence Program — to position the FBI to meet current and emerging national security and criminal threats by: 1) aiming investigative work proactively against threats; 2) building and sustaining enterprise-wide intelligence policies and capabilities; and 3) providing useful, appropriate, and timely information and analysis to the national security, homeland security, and law enforcement communities. We then set out to embed intelligence processes into the day-to-day work of the FBI, from the initiation of a preliminary investigatian to the development of FBI-wide strategies. 000000364 aM die S