◆ SpookStack

•xr taken in the knowledge that on the day we might be largely on our own, supported overtly probably only by Australia and New Zealand. We might also be putting a rod in pickle for ourselves, or for any other government whose policies did not suit the host government (cf. New Zealand over sport) at a future CHGM. In spite of their private dislike of President Amin, some African Heads of Government would find difficulty in accepting a public insult to an African Head of State and, particularly if Amin had to be physically excluded from the UK, might boycott the Meeting. Many Governments would be embarrassed. Considerable harm might be dona to the Commonwealth$ it is easy to leave it. G. Deterrence 14, As indicated above, it is unfortunately only too likely fchofc expressions of dislike, and the hope that he will not attend the meeting, will positively encourage Amin in his determination to como* We have been unable to think of any way of overtly deterring him which might have some chance of success, but we might consider again the suggestions referred to at the end of the letter of 4 February to No. 10 (which the Prime Minister clearly did not much favour) that ways could be found of making Amin fear either for his safety if he visited the UK, or that a coup might be mounted in his absence*. D. Further Action within the Commonwealth 15. East African Department have suggested that we could perhaps follow up our confidential soundings, and the further ones which Lord Thomson is likely to make, with a second round of Commonwealth consultation. In this second round we could point to the near unanimity which our soundings had revealed that Amin's presence would not be welcome. We could also be more explicit about a) the damage to the CHGM which Amin's presence would cause; b) the profound opposition to his presence which exists in this country, and the consequent risk of disordern if he were to come. We might then go on to seek agreement to an effort being made, with general Commonwealth support, to persuade Amin to agree that bo should not attend. Mr Ramphal would be the obvious person to undertake such a mission. However, he can only act on the instructions of all Commonwealth Governmenta, and he has made it plain that he in not prepared to embark on a formal exercise of consultation with Governments on the subject, and that he could not achieve the rleci m d result. 16. Notwithstanding the general view that Amin's presence at the CHGM would not be welcome, it is likely that such a mandate would in any case not be obtainable* It is also possible that even if it were -SECRET -.4- /obtained