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CONFIDESTIAL COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE: BEACTION OP THE AFKICAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTEI TO THE QUESTION OP AMIN 1. Between 13-22 April Lord Thomson visited six African Commonwealth countries: Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria. The following points emerged from his discussions with African leader about Amin: (i) There is general and intense dislike of Amin. Commonwealth Africa avoids contact with him as far as possible. (Ghana is in the process of.withdrawing all diplomatic personnel from Kampala). (ii) There is a general desire to distinguish between Uganda and Amin. Everyone hopes Amin will stay away from London but that Uganda will be represented at the same level as in Ottawa and Kingston. Kaunda said he would be ready to vote for Uganda's suspension of membership from the Commonwealth (and the UN and OAU) as long as Amin was in charge; but he was not willing to take the lead in this. (iii) There is a widespread belief that Amin will keep everyone guessing until the last moment but a feeling, which may be wishful thinking, that in the end he will stay away. If he does come to London, most people think his preasice will wreck the Conference. (iv) There is general agreement that publicity is counter- productive in dealing with Amin and that we should use discreet diplomatic channels to try to dissuade him from coming. The Africans think the Arabs would be the best intermediaries, particularly the Libyans and Saudis. Colonel Qadaffi is thought to be the one person who has some real influence with Amin. (v) Nearly all think Amin may be discouraged from attending if we play discreetly on the threat to his safety of coming to London. (vi) Whilst there is general agreement that Aminfs behaviour is so deplorable that he is in a class by himself, there is also anxiety that by excluding him we shall breach the unwritten convention of non-interference in the internal affairs of another Commonwealth country. This fear led General Obasanjo to suggest that Amin should be treated as the British Government's problem and that other Cbmmonwes countries should not be involved. (vii) Despite the fear outlined in (vi) above, it is highly unlikel; that any African leader would refuse to attend the CHGM if Amin were excluded. However, timing will probably be important. The OAU should not be given any opportunity to try to arouse or coordinate African opinion on this issue and Amin*s exclusion should not, therefore, be announced until the last possible moment. If that were done, there is no evidence that the African countries would make a major issue of Amin's exclusion, nor that any of them would walk out. CONFIDENTIAL