◆ SpookStack

111. (Continued) Ob saan: eo aT ith some of the ray indicator reports vas not an te for professional analytical reporting on “sittatiga, ATs raw IMtsliTTesAse Feports vely in targeting the October 1!/; U-2 mission the discovery of offensive missiles in Cuba, the significance of the important Indicators involved was not com- municated to the President, aia rare rn mS Oe we Se _ (3) Despite the intelligence indicators which were accum- ng even before the U-2 discovery on October 14, the intel-. ee community did not produce for the benefit of policy-level mers a revision of its erreneous National Intelligence mate of September 19, — We believe a further and exhaustive examination, not. limited to Cuba, should be made by the intelligences community of the complex analytic process employed throughout the community in the assessment of intelligence indicators, We base this belief on the nature of the indicetor-type data which our re- view discloses was availzble during the period rrom May to Getober 1962. 7“ ——— et Thirty five examples of such available indicators are set forth in Annex A to this report. In cataloging such examples we anpreciate fully that we have the benefit of a perspective which was not then possessed by the intelligence community, We are also ayare that the illustrations listed are but a small number taken from the great volume of reports which were received and which included some demonstrably erroneous information. Wwe urge that the ennexed illustrations be read not only for their indi- viduel content but also for the purpose of noting the cumulative significance of the information being received, These indicators S sety of intelligence sources, such as ; m vefugees, clandestine agents, and y foreign dip 3 They dealt with various aspects of the Soviet militery build-up in Cuba, including the introduction of high-ranking Soviet military personalities vho were special- ists in the fields of military construction, enzincering, elec- tronics, jet pilot training, surface-to-air missile defenses, and Soviet long-range air and strategic striking forces; the assign- ment to Cuba of Soviet specialists in rocketry and atomic arms; the statements made ty persons highly placed in the Castro regime concerning expectations thet 2 nuclear delivery capability would be established in Cuba; the sightings by groun2? observers of offensive missiles being deployed under strict Soviet control 368