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111. (Continued) =} waz 6 4 icon mevheés such 2 Fg 2 > ip + - * i =e ant = in cra Mazee inverrogevion, and Smaic intveilisence cov- ' (:) Although we were unable to establ existence of 2 soliey which prevented overrlying erees o mere surface- vo-cir Sissile installetions were present, voal Intelligence igemcy and others relieved thet such @ restricts cia in fact pre- veil, ‘ie note in tnis regaré that in the Dacemzer 25 répory of the \ Director of Centrel Intelligence it ts stated tnet aivhcough the . | paucity of records makes it impossible to determine whether or not i there was such a restriction, it is nevertneless clesr thet opersa- {tional elements were under the impression that such an injunction twes in exrect, . (5) Apparently the Srecial Group was not made fully aware of tne delaying effects on the quisition of aerial invelligence @nich could and did _reselt from changes in 2 CEA proposal Tor the conduct ‘of 2 U-2 mission. On September 10 tix cEe proposed tha the Special: “Group approve and recomend the é ing oF a U-2 ih to provide extensive perinherel cover “Subs és “well - as legs directiy over Cuban a2r sdace, cretery of $ (eye) to this combining of an actus with the over-. fl international waters, He re long _p2tipnerai £i id draw attention, ond if the raft were to fait into _eneny s after an overSlight of Cube, this vould put the United States in a poor position to “stend on its rig ace to overtly inter- National water Accor@ingly, the Secratary : Stave proposed - thas the Septem er flignts pe broxen into four. separate missions, tuo of them peripheral send _ivo directly over Cuba, and the CIA made olens tc do so, Hewever, CTA made it en operational practice not to overfly if there was more than 25 per cent overcast, and the Director of Central Intelligence points out in his December’ 26 Tepert that the poor wea ther in September plus the necessity for | ‘flving four separate missions instead of one resulted in prolenging cne time required to get the desired coverege of Cus2, In fact, the next successful U-2 mission was not flown until September 26, ave feel thet under thes? circumstances the Special Group Should hay been informed of the factors operating to delay the four-flisnt " Jeoverege, ane given an opnortunity to reconsider the advisability or anx mission over tne eritical ter argey sreas urgently requiring sur~ veiliance We elso feel that the Syecisl Group should 22 possessed 2 2 nisz whicn youl a autonatizelly pick up such missions of 365