◆ SpookStack

been a significant factor in gaining support of the anti-Castro 41/ elements inside Cuba. Once again one might wonder whether the most senior Agency personnel were in fact the best qualified witnesses to present, to explain, or to defend the Agency before the Taylor Committee. In addition to the possible support from anti-Castro elements within Cuba, another of the questions which had sur- faced in the earlier meetings was raised during the course of the fourth me.eting. This was the question concerning the relative merits of the Trinidad and the Zapata plans, particularly the planned air operations--both as scheduled for Trinidad and as evolved for the Zapata plan. General David Gray may have been the witness who responded to a question probably asked by Robert Kennedy: "At the 16 March meeting was the JCS preference for the original Trinidad plan over the Zapata 42/ presented?"; and Gray responded, "Idon't think so." - I.f this was Gray's answer, it was as ambivalent as some of the answers made by CIA representatives who were either in ignorance of the facts, or hesitant to risk their reputations by being forthright. Whether Gray, Bissell, or Cabell answered, all three should have known and recalled that the JCS preference - for Trinidad over Zapata had been enunciated clearly in JCSM-166-61 of 15 March 1961 which had been sent to Secretary of Defens~ Robert McNamara; and it would have been logical for the Secretary of Defense to bring this to the attention of the President. 53 " .,