◆ SpookStack

of success that had attended the attempts to supply--particularly by air drop--dissident elements in Cuba.* The committee had further reason to be confused when on the one hand a response was given which indicated that not only would it have been necessary to achieve a successful lodgement for the invading brigade but, as Hawkins had suggested in the previous meeting, it would be necessary for the brigade to move out of the lodgement in order to acquire support from the Cuban population. In response to another question, however, it was stated sim~ly that if the lodgement could have lasted for a week with the planned air operation, that in itself would have * In a memorandum probably written immediately following the fourth meeting of the CSG, Colonel King addressed a memorandum to the DCI via the DDP to explain the reasons for the failure of the anti-Castro dissidents to rally to the invaders' support. He placed the blame principally on President Kennedy's 12 April 1961 press conference which ruled out direct US intervention in Cuba, but also noted the repressive measures introduced by Castro, the isolation of the invasion site from any known area of active dissidence, and interestingly in the concept of the isolated area invaded, the lack of any "initial indication of military success-- no tpwn was taken, no radio station was captured. Fence sitters had no concrete reason to believe they should switch loyalties." 40/ Preparation of this memo gives further reason to believe that King, like Dulles, was in attendance at the fourth session of the CSG. 52 ..... "